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 This dissertation is an inquiry into the ways rhetoric, as the study of the art of 
language use, and literature, as the art of written language, were coherently theorized 
in Enlightenment Scotland to articulate the complex nature of language and its 
inherent relationship to the human mind and its faculties. The chapters contained in 
this manuscript dissertation are previously published studies in eighteenth-century 
Scottish rhetorical theory, examining the multiple and sometimes contradictory 
legacies of this important body of work on language pedagogy, philosophy of mind 
and language, and political theory. These studies offer new grounds for examining the 
legacies of Scottish rhetoric, amongst them the creation of a new aesthetic of 
language arising from the moral sentiments tradition.  
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Preface  
In the dominant tradition of rhetorical and literary history, Enlightenment 
Scottish rhetoric culminates with the creation of Hugh Blair’s Regius Chair of 
Rhetoric and Belles lettres at Edinburgh University in 1762. This historical moment 
marks the official beginning of the study of literature as an academic field, and 
inaugurates literary criticism as the primary means of access to the literary arts. 
Essentially, this dissertation argues that Scottish rhetoric, and its belles lettres 
tradition, enjoys more trajectories than the one extensively examined in the accepted 
version of the legacy of Hugh Blair. I suggest that if the pedagogical and critical 
posterity of the Chair of Rhetoric and Belles lettres is temporarily ignored, one may 
look with less prejudice at the vastly interconnected philosophical vision in which the 
new rhetoric played a central role, and see that there are, and there were, multiple 
trajectories to this theory of language that are equally important to the legacy of 
Scottish belles lettres. This argument calls attention to some of the lesser-examined 
legacies of Scottish rhetoric, amongst them the creation of a new aesthetic of language 
arising from the moral sentiments tradition. The belles lettres tradition represents one 
branch of new aesthetic of language arising from the Scottish moral sentiments 
tradition, but it is more closely associated with an aesthetic of reading. Another, 
perhaps more important, corollary between the moral sentiments tradition and the 
philosophy of language which developed in Enlightenment Scotland is a new aesthetic 
of writing, and particularly, of poetry. This new aesthetic, found in writers such as 
Robert Fergusson and Robert Burns, values the contingent and particular as moral 
contexts through which to create shared experience and moral consensus, and turns, 
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quite naturally, as did the use of vernacular language. This is but one of the many 
exciting new ways of looking at the literary legacy of the Scottish Enlightenment, long 
overdue for a critical re-examination. 
 All pieces included in this manuscript format dissertation share the goal of 
challenging the accepted narratives within literary and rhetorical histories of this 
period, particularly surrounding the practices of literary criticism attached to the belles 
lettres tradition. These challenges in turn help to create a platform for a new critique of 
the relationship between rhetoric, philosophy, and literature in this period based on 
their synchronicity, and therefore encompassing literary achievements that would have 
seemed previously at odds, though contemporaneous. Susan Manning, in Poetics of 
Character (2013), cogently argues for precisely this type of fresh examination of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. My dissertation takes up Susan Manning's call to "explore the 
potential of an alternative (perhaps complementary) literary history alert to nuances of 
connection and comparison" (xii), not, in this case to examine the rhetorical breadth of 
the concept of character as she does, but to look instead at the "arabesque patterning, 
metaphorical chains and networks of analogy" (xxiii) that represent a fully-realized 
coherence between language and moral philosophy, most strikingly within the work of 
Adam Smith.  We would now recognize that Smith’s body of work taken as a whole 
contains an expansive and deeply networked moral theory most clearly delineated 
within the Scottish Enlightenment’s stunning understanding of language and its place 
in the moral economy of the social human person. In other words, scholars now 
recognize that Smith’s work in Theory of Moral Sentiments developed alongside his 
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work in rhetoric and language theory.1 Smith’s work stands at the forefront of a more 
widely encompassing rhetorical vision; even so, the present state of scholarship 
contains the need for a literary-minded critique of his rhetorical and moral thinking. It 
is Smith’s “peculiar power of perception” – the moral sense – that must be accounted 
for within aesthetic judgment in order to create compelling grounds for a new literary 
critique.   
 In this spirit, the dissertation is an inquiry into the ways rhetoric and literature 
were coherently theorized in Enlightenment Scotland to articulate the nature of 
language and its inherent and complex relationship to the human mind and its 
faculties. As an overarching program of research, the three chapters contained in this 
dissertation are distinct and free-standing studies in eighteenth-century Scottish 
rhetorical theory, examining through three different lenses the multiple and sometimes 
contradictory legacies of this important body of work on language pedagogy, 
philosophy of mind and language, and political theory. All three chapters taken 
together conscientiously seek to build a comprehensive interdisciplinary understanding 
of this area of the Scottish Enlightenment in order to contribute to a stable platform 
from which, in future work, I can critically approach the new aesthetic of 
Enlightenment vernacular poetry. Scottish Enlightenment thinkers produced not only 
seminal works of rhetoric and philosophy, but also a new literary aesthetic, and 
practices of reading and writing whose influences still reverberate within our modern 
academic disciplines. This same movement also created the modern academic 
                                                             
1 See Jerry Evensky, Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, 2005), 
Stephen McKenna, Adam Smith: Rhetoric of Propriety (Albany: State University of 
New York, 2006), Nicholas Phillipson, Adam Smith (Yale: Yale University Press, 
2011) for examples of this more holistic approach to Smith studies.   
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disciplines as discrete fields, and much of the intellectual work contained herein is a 
re-conceptualization of the disciplinary unity required to approach eighteenth-century 
rhetoric and literature with the degree of interconnectedness and interdisciplinary 
cohesion within which it was formed. Scottish rhetoric cogently theorizes the nature of 
language and its constitutive relationship to the human faculties. Most particularly, 
Scottish Enlightenment rhetoric postulates the connection between moral, social, and 
language practices: an understanding of the moral properties of language is essential to 
forming a critique of Scottish Enlightenment literary productions that apprehends this 
basis of their innovative aesthetic. The Scottish belles lettres tradition most frequently 
characterizes the relationship between eighteenth-century Scottish moral sentiments 
theory and language theory. But as these chapters demonstrate, often the historical 
narrative of belles lettres contains retrospective mischaracterization of both “taste” and 
the moral sentiments theory. What has lingered in the word belles lettres is the more 
nineteenth-century sense of moral and social obligation contained within the reading 
practices of belles lettres, what has been made explicit is more twentieth-century 
argument connecting belletristic language practices, social mobility, and elitism. 
Eighteenth-century rhetoric has a long-standing critical connection to belles lettres, 
and this is a perfectly appropriate starting point to a conversation about literature and 
rhetoric in the eighteenth century. Yet the conversation must extend past this, and not 
as much work has been done to examine the critical philosophical and theoretical 
configurations between literary productions, rhetoric, and belles lettres. The legacy of 
belles lettres extending into the study of nineteenth-century literature is well-
documented also, but like the other disciplinary areas addressed in the works included 
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here, the eighteenth-century roots are commonly presented as points of departure for 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers, and in retrospective critique. In contrast, 
this dissertation presents material that looks at these overlapping areas of rhetoric, 
literature, belles lettres and moral theory from the more productive perspective of 
Scottish Enlightenment philosophy of language and mind.  
 The order of the manuscripts is not chronological, as I have placed the most 
recent publication first, for the reason that the “Introduction” I wrote to the Scottish 
Philosophy of Rhetoric (2014) offers a comprehensive introduction to the period and 
my work on it. All three of the manuscripts consist of previously published work in 
their published formats.  
Summaries:  
 The first chapter of this dissertation is the “Introduction” to Scottish 
Philosophy of Rhetoric (ed. Rosaleen Keefe, Edinburgh: Imprint Academic Press, 
2013). It is included here at the outset because it provides a concise introduction to the 
major figures, their works, and themes of Scottish eighteenth-century rhetoric. The 
central argument in this introduction is that the rhetorical theories of Francis 
Hutcheson, Alexander Gerard, Henry Home, Lord Kames, Thomas Reid, George 
Campbell, Hugh Blair, and somewhat later, Alexander Bain, are crucial components of 
the Scottish philosophical canon. Along with a brief synopsis of rhetoric and logic in 
eighteenth-century Scotland, this chapter describes six identifiable themes within the 
Scottish rhetorical tradition: the orientation of the rhetor towards the good, rhetoric as 
a moral art, the theorization of taste, the turn towards literary criticism, rhetoric as a 
means of personal improvement, and the advocacy of a simple, direct style.  A final 
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section of this chapter summarizes the contents of the readings from the original 
eighteenth-century texts that I chose for inclusion in the volume. This introduction 
provides a succinct but thorough introduction to Scottish Enlightenment thinking. Like 
the other publications included in this dissertation, it provides evidence for, as one 
reviewer puts it, the “substantive moral, epistemological, and civic purposes” within 
the Scottish rhetorical tradition.  
 Chapter 2 consists of “The Legacy of Petrus Ramus in U.S. Composition: 
Realism, Scottish Common Sense, and Peircean Pragmatic Method,” a chapter which 
was included in an edited scholarly book entitled Ramus, Pedagogy, and the Liberal 
Arts: Ramism in Britain and the Wider World (Ed. Steven Reid and Emma A. Wilson. 
London: Ashgate Press, 2011). This chapter examines the complicated legacy of the 
supposed separation of rhetoric and dialectic instituted by the work of Petrus Ramus in 
the sixteenth century, and its continuance in the work of the Scottish rhetoricians of 
the eighteenth century. By making a case for the multiple trajectories of Scottish 
Enlightenment rhetoric via its connection to the work of the nineteenth-century 
American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, this chapter challenges the accepted 
logic of the history of composition studies with regards to Ramism and Scottish 
rhetoric.  The belles-lettres tradition, as it came into American university curriculums 
via the texts of Hugh Blair, has been credited with sponsoring the practice of criticism, 
and moreover, positivistic, realist criticism, as the primary approach to reading and 
writing in the classroom. This approach occurred within the pedagogy of reading (as it 
became a discipline of literary criticism) and also for writing (as it became the sub-
discipline of composition). By the twentieth century, progressive educators had 
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roundly rejected the pedagogical products of bellestric literary practices, namely 
“current-traditional” rhetorical teaching and positivistic literary criticism. As a part of 
this rejection, it was argued that “current-traditional” rhetoric2 and positivist criticism 
seem to share the Ramistic separation of invention from rhetoric. Based on this shared 
separation, twentieth-century rhetorical history argues for the connection between 
Scottish rhetoric and Ramism, even though by the eighteenth-century Ramism as a 
movement was long-since forgotten in Scottish universities. As an alternative to this 
narrative, this chapter points out that the key rhetorical concept of “taste” within the 
work of Blair and the Scottish rhetoricians is not a function of the dyadic relationship 
between logic and language. It is rather a mediating faculty between the senses, 
imagination, and reason. The Scottish theory of “taste,” is, in fact, a close 
philosophical relative to C.S. Peirce’s semiotic theory. Peirce acknowledged his debt 
to Scottish common-sense Enlightenment thinkers, and this chapter examines Peircean 
semiotic theory’s use of Scottish rhetoric, thereby offering a re-reading of the 
ideological linkages between Ramism, Scottish rhetoric, and eighteenth-century 
language practices.  Both the rhetorical theory of “taste” within language-use and 
Peirce’s theory of “semiosis” within the structures of signification employ methods 
that are remarkably similar in function and outcome. Both methods unite logic and 
rhetoric within a flexible method that encompasses personal and social invention, 
multiple levels of mediation of perception, and also a real world within which they 
create.  A careful analysis of the overlaps between these two methods, in addition to 
the historical and philosophical connections between Peirce and Thomas Reid 
                                                             
2 See Manuscript Two, pp 51-53, for a full discussion of this term.  
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provides good grounds to re-evaluate the ideological connection between Ramism, 
Scottish Common Sense’s theorization of taste, and American composition’s “current-
traditional” rhetoric.  
 The final chapter of this dissertation is an article that was awarded the George 
Elder Davies Prize for best graduate student paper at the Princeton Theological 
Seminary Bicentenary Celebration Conference at the Center for the Study of Scottish 
Philosophy and was subsequently published in the Journal of Scottish Philosophy 
(Vol.11, 2013, Issue 2: 213-228). Entitled “Common-Sense Rhetorical Theory, 
Pluralism, and Natural Law Theory,” this article offers a close examination of the 
philosophy of language in Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric as well as Blair’s 
concept of taste and Alexander Bain’s theory of the “doubleness of language”3 in order 
to articulate (more fully here than in the previous chapters) the ways in which Scottish 
rhetoric conceives the epistemic4 functions of language. This chapter argues that 
Scottish rhetoric does not see rhetorical knowledge as permanent and stable but rather 
as a conditional exchange between the rhetor and her audience, which is one of the arts 
constitutive to human nature itself. Because of the inherent sociability of all of the 
human faculties of language, from which reason is derived, moral consensus is a key 
area of concern. As all of the higher faculties of man operate contextually, education 
and civil institutions take on a moral function as well. And finally, on account of the 
praxis of rhetorical personal and civic taste, this chapter suggests that Scottish 
                                                             
3 Bain [1877] (2005) English Composition and Rhetoric, 176. 
4 By this term, I mean the functions of language that actually bring into being new 
understanding, practices, knowledge, or ways of knowing.  This may be in contrasted 
to language’s mimetic function.  
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Enlightenment rhetoric offers a tool necessary for the continuance of a pluralistic 
society. For pluralism to function there must be a means of achieving conditional 
forms of moral consensus, and the Scottish rhetors of the eighteenth century were 
deeply invested in meeting this need within their own Enlightenment milieu.  
Conclusion 
 The Scottish Enlightenment discovered ways of theorizing language that are 
resonant in what are today widely divergent fields, from political theory to theories of 
cognition, and that Scottish Enlightenment thinking offers a profoundly relevant 
understanding of the ethical and moral dimensions of language learning and language 
use. Eighteenth-century Scotland gives us an example of the kinds of development 
possible when the disciplines operate in an open and cooperative manner, united under 
the practice of the most ancient discipline, rhetoric, and a most fundamental inquiry, 
language-use. In our own modern iterations of deliberative democratic discourse, we 
would do well to look again at this moment of rhetorical flourishing. 
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Abstract 
 This manuscript consists of the entire “Introduction” to the Scottish Philosophy 
of Rhetoric: Selected Philosophical Writings (2014).  This text provides a succinct 
overview of the Scottish rhetorical tradition within the context of the Scottish 
philosophical tradition, focusing on the eighteenth-century Enlightenment period. It 
outlines six identifiable themes in Scottish rhetoric. It outlines six identifiable themes 
in Scottish rhetoric: the rhetor’s necessary orientation to the good, rhetoric as a moral 
art, the exploration of taste, the foundations of literary criticism, rhetoric as a means of 
personal improvement, and advocacy of simple style are explained as contiguous with 
the larger philosophical contexts of understanding mind, language, and moral sense. 
Finally, this manuscript describes the Scottish writers and the selections of their work 
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Preface 
 The following manuscript was written in 2013 after I was asked to prepare and 
edit a volume on Scottish rhetoric for the Library of Scottish Philosophy, and it was 
commissioned by the Center for the Study for Scottish Philosophy at Princeton 
Theological Seminary. My volume is number 16 in the series. The series is meant to 
help expand and make accessible more of the Scottish philosophical tradition than just 
the major writings of the central figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. The Scottish 
Philosophy of Rhetoric is unique in that it offers readings that connect the 
philosophical tradition with the rhetorical textbooks produced under its influence. 
Included in this dissertation is the short “Introduction” to the volume.  
 The eighteenth-century primary texts to which this manuscript refers are as 
follows, in alphabetical order by author:  
Bain, Alexander. English Composition and Rhetoric. London: Longmans and Green, 
 1877.  
 
Blair, Hugh. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. Second edition, corrected. 
 London: T. Cadell, W. Strahane; Edinburgh: W.Creech. 1785.  
 




Gerard, Alexander. Essay on Taste. Second Edition. Edinburgh: A. Millar, 1758.  
 
 
Homes, Henry Lord Kames. Elements of Criticism. Fourth Edition. Edinburgh: 
 Kincaid and Bell, 1769. 
 
 
Hutcheson, Francis. Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas Of Beauty and 
 Virtue.London: J. Darby of Bartholomew Close, 1725.  
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___. System of Moral Philosophy in Three Parts. Glasgow: R. and A. Foulis, 1755.  
 
 
Smith, Adam. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Delivered at the University of 
 Glasgow by Adam Smith. Reported by a Student in 1762-3). Edited and with an 
 Introduction and notes by John M. Lothian. Edinburgh and London: Thomas 
 Nelson and Sons, 1963.   
 
 
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Intellectual and Active Powers of Man, Dublin: L. 
 White, 1786.  
___. Inquiry into the Human Mind upon the Principles of Common Sense, 4th Edition. 
 London: Cadell, Edinburgh: J. Bell and W. Creech, 1785.  
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TEXT 
Scottish Rhetoric and Scottish Philosophy 
 The Scottish contribution to the creation of modern Western institutions is one 
of the most surprising chapters in the history of modernity. It is counterintuitive to 
suppose that such a small and low profile country should be the source of 
philosophical innovations that forged the conceptual foundations of political, social, 
psychological, educational, and economic systems still functioning today. It may also 
seem counter-intuitive to regard the oft-forgotten discipline of rhetoric as central to the 
philosophical practice that produced these foundations. So in imagining a volume on 
the Scottish Philosophy of Rhetoric, it may appear overambitious to link the Scottish 
philosophical tradition to the Scottish rhetorical texts so closely, especially since the 
Enlightenment rhetorical tradition, particularly when viewed from the perspective of 
writing and reading pedagogy, is often seen as simply an obtuse and dated addendum 
to the main philosophical tradition. 
 On the other hand, within rhetorical history, the eighteenth century is widely 
regarded as the central nexus of the development of many modern conversations about 
language, language-learning, social and cognitive development through language, 
semantics, linguistics, discourse theory, and civic participation. Further, any 
consideration of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century rhetoric must focus on the 
contributions of Scottish writers and professors such as George Campbell and Hugh 
Blair. The selections in this volume have been chosen in order to show readers both 
why the Scottish contributions to rhetoric are important for those conversations, and 
also how essential their place is in the Scottish philosophical tradition.  
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To whom amongst the many eminent Scottish Enlightenment thinkers should we look 
first for the key texts of Scottish rhetoric? Rhetoric, though a subject of widespread 
interest at that time, is hard to confine within any one discipline, as indeed it continues 
to be. Linda Ferreira-Buckley, describing the broad state of eighteenth-century 
rhetoric, points out that ‘then, as now, “rhetoric” is an expansive phenomenon and a 
slippery term. Understanding the eighteenth-century requires looking beyond 
disciplinary boundaries that may have come to seem natural’.5 The arguments 
regarding aesthetics, epistemology, and the ontology of perception, philosophy of 
mind, and logic put forward by Francis Hutcheson, Alexander Gerard, Lord Kames, 
and Thomas Reid in response to the innovations in philosophy, logic, and method that 
were made by Bacon, Newton, Locke, and Berkeley are now fixed parts of the 
philosophical context. But while the Scottish philosophers themselves considered 
rhetorical inquiry and teaching central to their own work, their ideas on rhetoric and 
language were developed even further by their students, Campbell and Blair (and 
several decades later, Alexander Bain), all of whom wrote rhetorical theory and 
textbooks that influenced generations of language learners on several continents. 
Often, these texts are taken to represent only the Scottish rhetorical tradition, but they 
have an equally important role in the philosophy of language. 
 The selections in this volume comprise a unique introduction to Scottish 
rhetorical innovations that have generally been overlooked in studies of the 
                                                             
5  Ferriera-Buckley, Linda,  ‘The Eighteenth  Century’,  in  The  Present State of 
Scholarship in the History of Rhetoric, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2010. 
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philosophical tradition, while at the same time being used to oversimplify the 
rhetorical tradition. This volume is the first of its kind to choose texts in such a way as 
to demonstrate, and not simply refer to, these essential connections between Scottish 
philosophy and Scottish rhetoric. Organized loosely by bio- graphic and bibliographic 
succession, the aim is to exhibit the variety and vigour of Scottish rhetorical thinking, 
while placing it within the broader conceptual structure developed and articulated by 
George Campbell and Hugh Blair. It requires some flexibility on the part of the reader 
to examine philosophical texts for their rhetorical theory, and at the same time read 
pedagogical texts for their underlying philosophy of language. Only in this way, 
however, do we arrive at a more complete picture of Scottish rhetoric, as a vibrant and 
resonant body of rhetorical theory and practice. It is my hope that a reader from any 
discipline, not only those interested in Scottish philosophy or rhetorical theory, will 
gain a new comprehension of the centrality of the Scottish rhetorical tradition to these 
topics. 
 
Rhetoric and Logic in Eighteenth-Century Scotland 
In the classical tradition, rhetoric is one of the three cornerstones of a basic education 
in the liberal arts, the trivium, which consisted of logic, rhetoric, and grammar. The 
study of rhetoric, defined by Aristotle as the ‘ability to see, in each particular case, the 
means of persuasion’,6 was since ancient times considered a first order in education; it 
                                                             
6 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, translated by George  Kennedy,  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991, 2.1, p. 36. Kennedy notes that Aristotle defines rhetoric into the genus of 
dynamis, or ‘potentiality’, indicating that rhetoric is the not the product of speech or 
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is easy to see how along with grammar, the basic means for forming intelligible units 
of speech, and logic, the art of constructing rationally valid arguments, these three 
together create a fitting foundation to intellectual inquiry. All of the authors included 
in this volume would have had a thorough background in the history and practice of 
rhetoric and logic. The relationship of logic to rhetoric is of particular importance to 
the development of what Wilbur Samuel Howell, in his seminal histories of 
eighteenth-century logic and rhetoric,7 termed the ‘new rhetoric’ of Enlightenment 
thinkers, and it is also crucial to understanding the rhetorical innovations of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. 
 Logic had undergone a transformation since the works of Francis Bacon, who 
persuasively condemned the classical Aristotelian syllogism as an insufficient tool for 
genuine scientific inquiry. Bacon argued that science required a logical form that 
allowed for observation and inquiry, and that syllogism and the art of deduction could 
only form arguments from what is, essentially, already known. A new logic of 
induction was necessary for the new scientific method. This inductive method relies 
not on a priori knowledge, but rather on observation of particulars, and probabilities of 
                                                             
writing, it is the ‘art of “seeing” how persuasion may be effected’ (p. 36, footnote 34). 
This is an important distinction, relative to the Scottish philosophy of rhetoric as well. 
The art of rhetoric must not be confused with the products of rhetorical arts. 
7 Howell, Wilbur Samuel, Eighteenth Century British Logic and Rhetoric, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1971; and Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-
1700,Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.  
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generalities. The discipline of logic, therefore, needed to be reformed. Now, Alexander 
Broadie argues that ‘in the forefront of this discussion on logic in the mid-eighteenth 
century’ and ‘pressing for debate toward further modernization of the discipline’8 was 
none other than Thomas Reid. Reid is much better known for his development of 
Scottish Common Sense philosophy, dealing with the more abstract branches of 
epistemology and philosophy of mind, but it is important to note that, like many of the 
thinkers included here for their important work in rhetorical theory, he was as well-
versed in science and mathematics as in philosophical inquiry. This is essential to 
understanding the motivation for the rhetorical innovations he, like others, advocated. 
In fact, the relation of logic to rhetoric and the concern with science is essential to 
understanding the particularly Scottish Enlightenment crafting of the ‘science of man’: 
that is, the application of the new scientific method to the study of the human mind 
and its products. First amongst the particular, observable phenomena produced by the 
mind is, of course, language. And here we can see, from a methodological point of 
view, the need for and keen interest in a new rhetorical theory.  
 Rhetoric in the classical tradition was concerned primarily with persuasion, but 
it became a key method of inquiry in the new science of man. It was seen as a tool for 
analysing the faculties of the mind that are observed in the processes of knowing, or 
coming to a belief or understanding. The Scottish rhetors were equally concerned with 
the implications of this knowledge; that is, with the formation of taste, of civic and 
                                                             
8  Broadie, Thomas Reid on Logic, Rhetoric, and the Fine Arts: Papers on the Culture 
of the Mind, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2004, p. xxiv. 
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personal virtue, and the creation of the bonds of sympathy and mutual understanding 
that form the basis of civil society. Their rhetorical theory is closely tied to a 
concordant philosophy of language, of aesthetics and the fine arts, and also of political 
philosophy. Among the thinkers included in this volume, many are indeed better 
known for their work in these allied fields: Francis Hutcheson is primarily considered 
a moral philosopher; Lord Kames was a leading legal thinker and historian who later 
turned to aesthetic inquiry; Alexander Gerard is known for his work on taste and 
genius; Adam Smith is primarily identified with economics and political theory; 
Thomas Reid is most notable as a philosopher of mind. Only George Campbell and 
Hugh Blair are identified as rhetoricians, although, like the others, their rhetorical 
theory was a practical extension of a polymathic range of interests. Two other Scottish 
thinkers relevant to rhetorical history must also be noted, though with explanation, 
however, one for his inclusion in this list of rhetoricians, and one for his exclusion. 
Alexander Bain, living and working as he did almost a full generation after the 
Enlightenment, is an essential thinker in understanding how Scottish rhetoric was 
transformed in the nineteenth century and beyond. While it owes much to the Scottish 
philosophy in which he himself was educated, Bain’s work on rhetoric and his 
rhetorical textbooks reflect what happened when much later, largely experimental 
work on cognition and psychology met with Common Sense philosophy of language. 
Much of what is today considered to be the legacy of Scottish rhetoric owes more to 
the pedagogical trends advanced by Alexander Bain than to the more philosophical 
works of earlier Scottish rhetoric. Bain’s influential writings helped develop the 
empirical tendencies of faculty psychology into a more positivistic perspective on 
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language use. The most striking exclusion from this volume is David Hume. 
 Hume’s work on the philosophy of mind and understanding is ever present in 
the work of his Scottish contemporaries, but his only direct writing on rhetoric, ‘On 
Eloquence’, though ostensibly dealing with the rhetorical art of oratory, is 
contradictory and notoriously difficult to interpret as rhetorical theory, and not easily 
included within the more identifiable concerns of Scottish rhetoric. Still, the exclusion 
of Hume from this volume should not be understood as a judgment on his relevance to 
Scottish rhetoric, only that his writings on rhetoric are primarily of interest to a more 
specialized audience.9 
 
Themes in Scottish Rhetoric 
 Several hallmarks of Scottish rhetoric need to be highlighted, so that the reader 
may critique and compare their development in the readings that follow. The list is 
neither exhaustive nor definitive, but six themes—the rhetor’s necessary orientation to 
the good, rhetoric as a moral art, the exploration of taste, the foundations of literary 
criticism, rhetoric as a means of personal improvement, and advocacy of simple 
style—provide a good guide to the rich and innovative Scottish contribution to an 
                                                             
9 A word might be said here also of the exclusion of John Witherspoon and his 
contemporary Scots in America. While Witherspoon was born and educated in 
Scotland, and is thus a product of the Scottish rhetorical tradition, his own rhetorical 
writings were written in and for the American context. For this reason they are better 
regarded as founding documents of the American rhetorical tradition. 
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ancient and complex discipline. 
 The first consistent theme found in Scottish rhetorical theory is that effective 
rhetoric is intimately connected to the rhetor’s own orientation to the true and good. 
Persuasion, and the creation of what is moving and pleasing to properly formed taste, 
is possible only when it is generated by one whose own moral and intellectual tastes 
have been properly formed. This follows Ciceronian rhetoric, along with Quintilian’s 
teaching that rhetoric is the ‘good man speaking well’. In addition, however, it reflects 
the new territory that rhetoric occupies in its relation to the scientific method and 
experiential knowing. Scientific thinking is also concerned with what is true, even if 
its observations and the general laws they generate are probable truths only. Rhetorical 
skill is thus tied to a posteriori inquiry—the audience judges not only by language and 
skilled argument, but by what they observe through their own experiences of the 
speaker. Effective language touches the ‘chord, which when struck, the human heart is 
made to answer’ (Blair, Reading XVII). This shared, universal faculty registers 
pleasure at what is true, consistent, virtuous, and laudable. Whether we are using 
rhetoric or listening to it, good rhetoric relies on all the faculties, internal and external, 
to judge the product. 
 The second, possibly most important, theme of Scottish rhetoric—the 
affirmation of rhetoric as a moral art—is closely tied to the first. Language is the first 
foundation of civic life, the establishment of basic contracts, conventions, and habits 
all of which profoundly shape social intercourse and the foundations of civility, and 
influence moral action and formation. Language use activates our internal sense and 
for this reason the Scottish philosophers were keenly interested in investigating both 
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childhood formation and the anthropological evidence of language development. Our 
internal inclinations and habits, they argued, are formed by internal and external 
patterns of understanding and approbation. Language is the tool by which we learn to 
distinguish, discern, and evaluate. Scottish philosophy thus conceives of rhetoric as the 
interface between the new science of man and its moral, ethical, and aesthetic 
implications. 
 That is why close attention was paid to what are now the most widely 
identified features of Scottish rhetoric, namely ‘taste’ and the foundations of criticism. 
Because language operates by social convention, the formation of those conventions is 
of great importance to civic life. Thus, how one’s taste is fashioned—whether or not it 
functions properly to discern what is good and beautiful and derive pleasure from it—
is a prerequisite not only of personal moral life and character, but of public ethics and 
standards of civility. For George Campbell, correct usage of language is what is 
‘reputable, national and present’, and it is collectively exercised taste that generates 
these criteria. Like the ancients, the Scottish rhetoricians viewed  rhetoric,  properly  
conceived and developed, as the first condition to liberty; civil discourse is the 
condition of political freedom. The exercise of polite and civil taste in language use 
was consequently of great concern, so that its development became increasingly 
important as the new rhetoric took deeper hold in education. In the excerpts that 
follow, different authors treat the concept of taste differently. Alexander Gerard’s 
theory is concerned to outline mental and sensory association and its moral 
implications, while Kames straightforwardly gives examples and descriptions of good 
(and poor) taste. Blair’s concept of taste is deeply philosophical, though his 
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pedagogical legacy has given him the reputation of an arbiter of eighteenth-century 
tastes rather than an aesthetic philosopher of language. It was Adam Smith who 
delivered the stunning first public lectures on Rhetoric and Belles lettres in Edinburgh 
in the late 1740s, but Hugh Blair who held the first academic chair with this title, and 
the development of the modern English literature department in which the study and 
critique of texts is a separate academic discipline has been dated to his appointment to 
it in 1762. ‘Belles lettres’— the appreciation and criticism of texts for their aesthetic 
value—had already been developed to some degree by the French academy. Smith was 
on the vanguard of bringing this new trend to Scotland, having studied at Oxford, 
where he read extensively in rhetoric, literatures of several languages, and the French 
belles lettres. Classical rhetoric had been limited to argument and persuasion, but as it 
responded to the development of logic it became more than the linguistic ‘dressing’ for 
argument. It made artistic expression in language its territory, and expanded its 
attention to other kinds of texts. Rhetoric was no longer simply an art of persuasion 
that made appeals to logos, ethos, and pathos. It now was the art of creating, and 
criticizing, language in all its written and oral forms. If the advancement of taste may 
be considered the third theme, the expansion of rhetoric to all things now considered 
literary may be counted the fourth. 
 An impulse to improvement constitutes the fifth notable theme in Scottish 
rhetoric. Its development as a discipline for the cultivation of taste and criticism was 
clearly a response to the new philosophy of mind, and its effect on logic and scientific 
method. But it was the political and social environment of Scotland in the eighteenth 
century that pushed it from the academy to the cultural centre stage. Scotland’s 
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growing political and economic freedom, together with an already well-functioning 
educational system, facilitated widespread interest in self-improvement for the 
purposes of personal advancement and civic participation. National improvement was 
also part of the agenda, because the 1707 Act of Union with England had made the 
Scots intensely concerned with national and cultural identity and historicity. Rhetoric 
had a two-fold part to play in this desire for improvement. First, as the discipline of the 
cultivation of personal taste, it was an aid to personal growth in the polite and civic 
arts, which in turn was expected to cultivate moral sensitivity. Secondly was a more 
pragmatic concern with language use as social currency favoured it. Smith was chosen 
for his public lectures not only for his knowledge of rhetoric and belles lettres and his 
skill as a teacher, but also for the ‘correctness’ of his speech and pronunciation. His 
lectures were considered edifying for his mastery of ‘proper’ English as well as their 
content. Though somewhat at odds with the rising interest in Scots Gaelic and national 
literature, the desire for greater social currency in the English political and economic 
system led to the avoidance of Scotticisms, and this particular kind of rhetorical 
‘improvement’ was one of the sources of rhetoric’s popularity, while the sixth, the 
advocacy of simple and direct style, is immediately related to it. Rhetoric as it was 
practised from Cicero on had tended to emphasize specific arrangement and ornate, 
carefully crafted style, so much so that rhetoric itself had become synonymous with 
lavish use of figures, tropes, and flowery impenetrability. In addition to meeting the 
needs of the altered political and economic circumstances of the eighteenth century, 
the new rhetoric promoted a plain and simple style in response to the changing 
religious attitudes. The need was for religious and civil leaders to preach and discourse 
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effectively to wider and more diverse audiences. Those who taught rhetoric at the 
universities in Scotland knew that many of their students intended to enter the Church 
or the Law, and that the old style of rhetorical ornamentation was not suited to 
congregations and juries who no longer came from social and educational stratum. 
Howell noted that the earlier rhetoric had followed a ‘ceremonial pattern’, which was 
found by successive generations to be perfectly suited to their tastes in a culture 
dominated by splendid rituals and by elaborate political pageantries of imperial, royal, 
and aristocratic rule. But the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation on the one 
hand, and the rise of the parliamentary government, on the other, tended to expose the 
uselessness of a merely ceremonial rhetoric and to create a thirst for the religious and 
political discourses that in content would be fully relevant to the facts of the given 
situation and in form would be simple and easy to grasp.10 
 In no place would both of these factors be more strongly at play than in 
Scotland, and nowhere therefore was the plain style more universally regarded. 
 
The Extracts 
 Most of the authors included here were contemporaries, and many were 
intimate friends or close acquaintances. Francis Hutcheson, who opens this selection, 
along with Henry Home, Lord Kames, Alexander Gerard, Thomas Reid, and to a 
lesser extent Adam Smith, have not traditionally been included among rhetoricians. 
Hutcheson and Reid are more typically read as philosophers and for their wide 
influence on the Scottish school. For both of these authors, I have selected texts from 
                                                             
10 Howell, p. 446. 
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their philosophical works that demonstrate the bearing philosophy of mind and 
philosophy of language have in understanding the rhetorical theory that developed 
under their influence. Hutcheson especially was in many ways a radical thinker. He 
succeeded Gershom Carmichael at the University of Glasgow, and was later succeeded 
by Adam Smith and Thomas Reid. He is therefore of the generation immediately prior 
to the rest of the authors (with the exception of Alexander Bain), and was an import- 
ant influence on the philosophical milieu in which they were all educated. In his 
Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas Of Beauty and Virtue (1725), he offers the 
outline of a moral and ethical system that can respond effectively to the egoistical 
challenge presented by Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville. Hutcheson argues 
that we have, in addition to the external senses, internal senses, among which is a 
moral sense, a sense of beauty, and a natural sociability. It is within the internal senses 
that language arises. Arts, including speech and poetry, are apprehended through our 
internal moral sense, by which we are stirred to participate in, and judge, the passions 
conveyed via the apprehension of ‘universal goodness, tenderness, humanity, 
generosity… and our relish in beauty, order, and harmony’ or their opposites. ‘Upon 
this moral sense’, Hutcheson tells us, ‘is founded the power of the orator (Reading I). 
The audience needs no knowledge of rhetoric to be moved by it, and thus the ethical 
burden falls upon the rhetor. Hutcheson’s fullest treatment of language is from his 
System of Moral Philosophy (1755) in which he devotes a chapter to ‘Our Duty in the 
Use of Speech’. In this essay (Reading II) Hutcheson describes the moral sense as 
directed outward; we are interested in the good of others, we derive pleasure from 
what is good not just for ourselves but for all. At the essay’s outset he summarizes 
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language in the moral economy: ‘As the power of communicating to each other our 
sentiments, desires, and intentions is one of the greatest blessings of the human 
species, so appropriately joined with our social feelings and affections, nature has also 
implanted a moral feeling in our hearts to regulate this power’ (Reading II). It is from 
this articulation of the ethical nature of speech, and therefore of learning effective 
speech, that we see Scottish philosophy making language the central human faculty 
that mediates between the individual (in his senses and capacities), and society. 
Hutcheson is often noted for the fact that he was one of the first professors to teach in 
English, and consciously used his own rhetorical powers to stir an affective response 
to his teaching. On many of Scottish rhetoric’s later themes and hallmarks, then, 
Hutcheson may be seen as both precursor and initiator. 
 Reid takes up these concerns from the perspective of moral philosophy. In the 
first extract I have chosen for this volume, he explains the basis of the principles of 
‘common sense’, those that may be taken for granted in a philosophy of the mind. To 
do this, he relies on language not only as a kind of metaphor, but as itself an object for 
the application of the inductive method. ‘The operations of our minds are denoted, in 
all languages, by active transitive verbs, which from their construction in grammar 
require not only a person and agent but likewise an object of the operation’ (Reading 
X). In the second selection from Reid’s work, he considers the philosophical 
implications of saying that some of the powers of the mind are, by virtue of a ‘real 
foundation in nature’, ‘social intellectual operations’ (Reading XI). Language is the 
primary indicator of the nature and existence of these operations, as well the means of 
conducting them. In the third extract Reid relates rhetorical inquiry to semiotics, and 
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explores rhetorical responsibility and the nature of contract in his discussion of 
‘artificial’ signs (Reading XII). This distinction between those parts of language 
which are ‘artificial’ (exist by mutual agreement of signification), and those that are 
‘natural’ (are inherently demonstrative of a communication), points to the close 
relationship that Reid perceives between the mind and the body. The philosophical 
grounding of much of the work of Scottish rhetoric is found within this conceptual 
framework – the reunion of the mind and body and the inherently social operation of 
reasoning and perception. 
 Alexander Gerard is best known for his work in educational reform and his 
writings on the defence and evidence for Christian doctrine. However, his works on 
taste and genius link the moral sense developed by Hutcheson and Reid with the rising 
discourse on the development of taste as a major component in the ethics of reading, 
writing, and speaking. His ‘Essay on Taste’ (1759) won a contest held by the 
Philosophical Club in Edinburgh, leading to publication and a wide audience. While 
Gerard is certainly not the sole influence on the treatment of taste in the rhetorical 
texts of Campbell and Blair, his articulation of the aesthetic of ‘fitness’ can surely be 
counted as an important connection between the ancients and the Scottish 
Enlightenment. ‘Utility, or the fitness of things for answering their ends’, is, for 
Gerard, the key to aesthetic practice, on two levels (Reading VIII). First, a work of 
aesthetic value is one in which invention is purposefully deployed in directing the 
‘choice, disposition, and embellishment of its parts’. Second, our ability to see fitness 
is a chief source of aesthetic pleasure, and therefore the first concern of criticism. 
Taste itself is a kind of sensation that supplies us with simple perceptions entirely 
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distinguishable from all that we receive by external sense or reflection. Thus taste is 
not sensory, or a pure idea; rather, it exhibits a set of perceptions that result from direct 
perception. The fitness of associated perceptions to communicate their qualities rouses 
our sympathy, which ‘enlivens’ our ideas, converting them to passions and in turn 
affecting taste. The excerpt from his ‘Essay on Taste’ included here (Reading IX) 
describes the relation of taste and genius in specifically rhetorical terms. He 
incorporates into the eighteenth-century discussion on taste, genius, and imagination 
the classical link between invention and execution. 
 This concept of fitness is also developed by Lord Kames. Whereas Gerard is 
concerned with the epistemology of taste, and its implications for the moral and 
ethical, Kames’s Elements of Criticism is concerned with its practical development. 
Kames’s position within the rhetorical tradition has been contested, and his Elements 
have rarely been read as rhetorical theory.11 Yet the extract included here on 
‘Language of Passion’ clearly conveys Kames’s sense of eloquence and rhetoric as a 
fine art that can, and should, be criticized using faculties of judgment aligned both to 
universal standards of truth and to the properly functioning faculties of mind and 
emotion. Through copious literary illustrations, he gives examples of how to judge 
rhetorical usage for its fitness. A man of law by education and practice, Kames 
                                                             
11 For a discussion of this, and ways of reading Kames’s Elements of Criticism as a 
rhetoric of criticism, see Beth Innocenti Manolescu, ‘Traditions of Rhetoric, Criticism, 
and Argument in Kames’s “Elements of Criticism”’, Rhetoric Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 
(2003), pp. 225–242. 
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exhibits the impulse to teach the art of rhetorical criticism—how to judge. For 
example, he describes, ‘words, being intimately connected with the idea they 
represent, the greatest harmony is required between them. To express, for example, a 
humble sentiment in high sounding words is disagreeable by a discordant mixture of 
feelings’ (Reading III). Kames is as much concerned with rhetorical practice (the 
judgment of works and art) as with philosophical theory (the principles of human 
nature that produce his principles of criticism). His particular account of criticism 
embodies many of the themes that are later developed by Hugh Blair, as well as 
constituting the clearest example of the type of positivist criticism later generations 
would roundly challenge. 
 It was Kames who commissioned the young Adam Smith to give public 
lectures upon the subject of Rhetoric and Belles lettres to the student body of 
Edinburgh, lectures he later gave to his students in Glasgow. Until the late 1950s, 
Smith’s interest in rhetoric and literature was known, but nothing about its content. 
However, in the late 1950s, a set of student notes from his lectures in the academic 
year 1762–63 were found in an Aberdeenshire manor house by a John Maule Lothian, 
who transcribed and published them in 1963. While these lecture notes obviously 
cannot be taken as a wholly accurate account of Smith’s thinking on rhetoric and 
belles lettres, they do give us enough intelligence to place Smith firmly at the 
vanguard of Scottish innovations in rhetorical theory. The selections included here 
offer insight into the many new directions in which Smith led his students’ rhetorical 
understanding and usage. In them, the reader can see Smith’s anthropological 
approach to language development, the subsequent national and regional emphasis on 
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best use (see Reading IV), and his idea that proper style is not one absolute ideal 
which conforms perfectly to truth or beauty, but rather is that which is most fitted 
equally to rhetorical exigency and the character of the author (Reading V). In this 
respect, Smith’s rhetorical theory is consonant with his ethical emphasis on the 
particular and practical as opposed to the general and speculative, which is also 
intimately tied to his ideas about sympathy and sentiment.12 
 Reading VI provides some of Smith’s most critical statements of the 
speculative bent to practical arts, and it is clear that he sees the practice of rhetoric as 
formative as well as indicative of character. Finally, in Reading VII, Smith ties his 
criticism of classical works and his theory of fittingness to both character and 
circumstance. He employs as the basis of his critical art an idea of historical, political, 
and economical contextualization that is radical both in its implications for the concept 
of rhetorical fittingness and because of its far- sighted vision of the nature of criticism. 
 George Campbell and Hugh Blair are the only writers in this volume whose 
reputations rest primarily on their contributions to eighteenth-century rhetorical 
theory, so that their work has become the standard exemplar of Scottish rhetoric. This 
is not entirely inaccurate. George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric was written over 
the course of several decades (begun in the 1750s and published in 1776), during 
                                                             
12 From Theory of Moral Sentiments: ‘When we consider virtue or vice in an abstract 
and general manner, the qualities by which they excite these several sentiments seem 
in a great measure to disappear, and the sentiments themselves become less obvious’ 
(IV, 2.2). 
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which he presented parts of it as papers to the Philosophical Society in Aberdeen. In 
the process he had much time to think about its content with his friends and 
colleagues, including Thomas Reid, Alexander Gerard, and John Stewart, John 
Beattie, and Hugh Blair.13 Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric is a discerning and 
thorough distillation of Common Sense epistemology, Humean philosophy of mind, 
and Baconian method, as well as classical and contemporary rhetorical theory. Some 
have speculated that its completeness may be one of the reasons why none of his 
contemporaries (notably Smith) wrote a philosophy of rhetoric.14 Three of the most 
important chapters from Campbell’s Rhetoric are excerpted here—his own 
‘Introduction’, in which he lays out his rhetorical system (Reading XIII); Chapter 1, 
‘The Nature and Foundations of Eloquence’, in which he describes the faculties to 
which eloquence (a word here nearly interchangeable for ‘rhetoric’) applies (Reading 
XIV); and Chapter 4, ‘Of the Relation which Eloquence bears to Logic and Grammar’, 
which makes a careful argument about the relation of truth to persuasion, expanding 
the role of rhetoric from persuasion to consideration of ‘not only… the subject, but 
also the speaker and hearers, and both the subject and the speaker for the sake of the 
hearers, or rather for the sake of the effect intended to be produced in them’ (Reading 
XV). Blair explicitly takes up the social implications of this philosophical rhetoric in 
the ‘Introduction’ (Reading XVI) to his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles lettres. His 
opening paragraph declares that the improvement of thought, human reasoning ‘is not 
                                                             
13 Blair was not a member of the Aberdeen Theological or Philosophical Societies, but 
he was a personal friend. 
14 Howell, p. 579. 
 24  
the effort or ability of one, so much as it is the result of the reason of many, arising 
from lights mutually communicated, in consequence of discourse and writing’. More 
than merely staking out the rhetorical arts as a primary human, intellectual, and moral 
concern, he makes rhetoric and the cultivation of critical faculties for the development 
and judgment of language the key academic discipline. Blair’s assertion that clear 
speaking and writing produces clear thinking is one that has been largely ignored as an 
Enlightenment idea—and it remains one still hotly discussed in composition 
pedagogy. I have chosen his chapter on ‘Taste’ so that readers may see the continuity 
and differences of Blair’s rather practical explanation of it versus the more conceptual 
discussions in the previous selections. Blair’s shadow loomed large on the teaching of 
rhetoric in the era that followed his own, and it is an interesting question of pedagogy 
whether  or not later interpreters and teachers of rhetoric emphasized the theoretical, 
productive, or interpretive rhetorical actions outlined in Blair’s lengthy textbook. 
 One of the factors affecting later interpretations of rhetoric was the nineteenth-
century movement towards the empirical study of cognition and learning. The ‘science 
of man’ of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers shifted from the ‘science’ of a proper 
epistemology, and philosophically- oriented psychology, to empirical, and often 
experimental, scientific inquiry into the physical workings of the mind and the 
emotions. At the forefront of this inquiry was Alexander Bain, founder of the journal 
Mind and an extremely influential academic educator and educational theorist. Bain’s 
body of work is large, but for the purposes of demonstrating the pedagogical 
implications of the direction his work gave to Scottish rhetoric I have chosen a 
selection of one of his rhetorical textbooks. 
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 As noted by Ferriera-Buckley at the outset of this introduction, rhetoric is a 
slippery term. It must, by its nature, encompass theoretical inquiry, but this is always 
in tension with its equally natural orientation to practice. To give the contemporary 
reader a proper understanding of Scottish rhetoric in its eighteenth-century 
development and articulation, and of its inestimably important influence on both the 
American university and the twentieth-century evolution of academic disciplines in the 
humanities, the rhetorical theory must be read alongside the pedagogical practices it 
inspired. The Scottish philosophy of rhetoric is part of the larger philosophical 
tradition, and it must be acknowledged that the two bodies of work—the philosophies 
and the rhetorics—are not synonymous. Nor are the texts synonymous with their 
interpretations and uses, especially as they were taken up in university instruction 
overseas. The attention that the present writers give to the philosophical and moral 
importance of what is circumstantial and specific must be seen in critical juxtaposition 
to the kind of rhetorical improvement with which Scottish rhetoric is most often 
credited in modern histories (the speaking of polite and proper English, free of 
possibly misleading regionalisms). Blair’s textbooks (which ‘went through sixty-two 
editions, fifty-one abridgments and ten translations in the century after its 
publication’),15 and the legacy of Scottish rhetoric in general, has become in many 
ways coterminous with the self-improving impulse to use standard English on the part 
of Scottish and American students. James Berlin argues that when Blair’s belles lettres 
tradition matured in American universities, uniting its attention to taste and literacy 
                                                             
15 Bizzell and Hertzberg, p. 657. 
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with the scientific approach to persuasion and human faculties, it proved the ideal 
discipline for the ‘creation of the professional meritocracy consisting of an emerging 
middle class in the newly-elective nineteenth century American universities’.16 
Following him, the American Compositionists of this century have made it a point to 
note in their own histories of rhetoric and composition that ‘the source of current-
traditional rhetoric17 is to be found in Campbell, Blair, and Whately’.18 This thesis has 
been readily accepted because of the widespread influence of Scottish Common Sense 
Realism in America at the time, which, it is assumed, provided appropriate grounds for 
positivist writing practices. However, this simple picture is complicated by the 
epistemological preference for local and specific language and its social and ethical 
ramifications as inductive evidence, the movement from classical languages to English 
vernacular that the Scottish rhetoricians promoted, and new works written in the 
Scottish dialects that they sponsored.19 
 These are just a few of the dimensions that a new inquiry into Scottish 
                                                             
16 Berlin, p. 8. 
17 Current-traditional pedagogy is the turn from rhetorical instruction to ‘composition’ 
instruction. It teaches writing from the standpoint of an ideal final product: the essay 
composed strictly to answer its ends, with close attention to spelling and grammar. 
Current-traditional pedagogies teach a definitive ‘right’ writing final product, which is 
perfectly attuned to the needs of the audience (as explained in terms of cognitive or 
psychological science). 
18 Ibid.  
19 Blair personally sponsored the works of James McPherson and Robert Burns among 
others. 
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philosophy and rhetoric in its eighteenth-century context might profitably explore. 
This would offer an enhanced historical understanding, as well as providing a novel 
way of approaching many of the current debates on the practice and politics of 
language use. The selections offered here uncover many rhetorical issues that are not 
only still relevant to today’s academic and political climate, but still very much alive 
in discussion, scholarship, and query. 
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Abstract 
 The following manuscript examines the methodology of Ramus’ separation of 
logic and dialectic within rhetorical pedagogy, and examines the multiple trajectories 
of these legacies within eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Scottish and American 
rhetoric and philosophy of language. Looking at the history of the belles lettres 
tradition, and its concomitant theorization of “taste,” this manuscript complicates the 
accepted history of bellestric rhetoric as solely the eighteenth-century grounds of 
“current-traditional rhetoric.” It offers a further development in the semiotic method 
of Charles Sanders Peirce, demonstrating that “taste,” in its fully theorized place in 
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Preface 
 The following manuscript is a chapter from a volume of collected essays on the 
work and influence of Petrus Ramus (1515-1572), a sixteenth-century rhetorician, 
logician, and pedagogical innovator whose influence on early modern education was 
profound, if little understood or regarded. Written largely in response to the 
challenges put forward for Walter Ong, SJ., and Mordechai Feingold, the volume 
from which this chapter is extracted revisits the history of Ramus’s influence across 
many subjects and in many diverse places, offering an interdisciplinary work of 
Ramism and Ramistic method much needed in current scholarship on the subject. The 
chapter here included has received widespread praise for bringing Ramism and the 
Ramistic legacy to bear on more modern academic and transatlantic pedagogy and 
rhetorical theory. “The Legacy of Petrus Ramus in U.S. Composition: Realism, 
Scottish Common Sense, and Peircean Pragmatic Method” addresses twentieth-
century century American rhetorical theory, its attributions of Ramistic method, and 
its roots in eighteenth-century rhetoric pedagogies responding to the Scottish 
Enlightenment rhetoric. It offers the methodological innovations of the nineteenth-
century philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce as an American counter-history of the 











 The relatively recent rise of the academic stature of the field of Composition 
and Rhetoric as a separate discipline in the United States has enabled a return of the 
popular definition of rhetoric to its Classical roots as the art ultimately of knowing 
and living in a mediated world. Encompassing within its field of study the vision of 
language and its uses as a field of both practical knowledge, pedagogy, and 
epistemology, in the past few decades modern rhetoricians and compositionists have 
turned back to evaluate the history of the field with regard to a self-conscious attempt 
to evaluate its current positions and future directions. This chapter attempts a critical 
look at the historical and philosophical trajectory of what is called ‘current-traditional 
rhetoric’, as it is ascribed as a pedagogical result, in part, of a Ramistic view of 
rhetoric: one which assumes a separation of dialectic from rhetoric, thus creating a 
dyadic relationship of logic to reality. Because current-traditional rhetoric removes 
invention from rhetoric and makes the creation of meaning a cold process of scientific 
logic, nearly every telling of its philosophical and historical path begins with the 
maverick moves of Petrus Ramus. Equally implicated in the development of “current-
traditional rhetoric” is the influence of the Scottish Common Sense rhetoricians, for 
like the Ramistic method, their works operate on a foundationally realist premise of 
language, and are largely held responsible for the development of literary and 
rhetorical criticism which in turn produced the major “current-traditional” 
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pedagogies. However, another branch of realist method can also be seen as related to, 
and possibly derivative of, Scottish Common Sense rhetoric: Charles Sanders Peirce, 
the pioneer of semiotics, openly acknowledges his debt to ‘the old Scots’ in the 
development of his pragmatic method. This chapter, then, shall question the historical 
and intellectual relationship between Ramist, Scottish Common Sense, and Peircean 
method and rhetoric. 
 This chapter does not attempt to argue that these three pedagogical methods are 
synthetically and unquestionably related. There are between them many profound 
differences and original interpretations of the nature of language, logic, and 
knowledge. What this chapter does argue for, however, is a critical re-evaluation of 
the ideational genealogy between them. If we claim current-traditional rhetoric as a 
pedagogical end point of the Ramistic separation of dialectic and rhetoric, we must 
find some way to account for the radical divergences between this pedagogy and the 
Common Sense rhetoric from which it is assumed to derive, especially in light of the 
relation of Common Sensism to the origins of American pragmatism. 
 By suggesting that the popular narrative of ascribing a singular pedagogical 
outcome to the method of Ramus, or to Scottish Common Sense rhetoric, is 
inadequate, the call will hopefully be made to open ways of seeing and 
contextualising the work of these thinkers and their followers as more generative, 
complex and multiple than has been accounted for.  In pointing out deficiencies in our 
understanding of the work of Ramus and the Common Sense rhetoricians, particularly 
by suggesting that American Pragmaticism shows traces of a Ramist lineage, this 
chapter aims to provide support for a re-evaluation of Ramus’ contribution to the 
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evolution of Composition studies in the U.S.. Indeed, it may well be that pointing out 
this deficiency provides a link towards the fuller evaluation of Ramus called for by 
Kees Meerhoff, who argues that: 
‘ … far from being the start of an unfortunate evolution, the work of Ramus is rather 
the conclusion of a long humanist tradition during the course of which reading texts (a 
reading integrated more and more closely with a logic in its turn solidly attached to 
rhetoric) constituted the foundation both of creative invention and of the edifice of the 
human sciences’.20 
 Perhaps, if we include both current-traditional rhetoric and pragmatic rhetoric 
as branches of the Ramistic tree, we may find that his influence, like his method, took 
on dichotomous overtones among his later disciples.  
Current-Traditional Rhetoric: Background and History 
 The field of Composition and Rhetoric has had multiple and altering historical 
frameworks, and the past two decades have seen an active re-engagement with the 
process of defining its history and ideological debts. Within this redefinition, 
however, there is one historical narrative that has achieved a cohesive stance. Largely 
unchanged and unchallenged is the idea that the belletristic tradition of reading and 
writing, derived from eighteenth-century Scottish Common Sense rhetoric, was taken 
and transformed in the United States into a pedagogy now widely known as ‘current-
                                                             
20 Kees Meerhoff, ‘Melanchthon, Latomus, Ramus: Teachers of Careful Reading’, in 
Ton Hoenselaars and Arthur F Kinney (eds), Challenging Humanism: Essays in 
Honor of Dominic Baker Smith (Newark, 2005), p. 202. 
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traditional rhetoric’. In 1959 Daniel Fogarty SJ published Roots for a New Rhetoric, 
coining this term, and made the argument that it was passed down to American 
universities from the works of the Scots Hugh Blair and George Campbell.21 The 
current-traditional approach was later defined by James Berlin as a pedagogy in 
which: 
 
… truth in written discourse is conceived in exclusively empirical or rational terms, 
with persuasion relegated to oral discourse. The writing class is to focus on discourse 
that deals with the rational faculties:  description and narration to be concerned with 
sense impression and imagination...exposition with setting forth the generalised ideas 
derived from sense impression and understanding, and argument with understanding 
leading to conviction.22 
 
 Within this approach rhetoric is a form of criticism, teaching the centrality of 
transmitting the rational as it communicates reality, with a final pedagogical concern 
for correctness in speech and writing. Because of its philosophical assumption that 
there is not only a real world but that it can be communicated, it is a fundamentally 
epistemologically positivistic form of teaching composition, entirely focused on error 
correction and universalised literary form. Current-traditional rhetoric, at its most 
                                                             
21 Daniel Fogarty, Roots for a New Rhetoric (New York, 1959). 
22 James A. Berlin, Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges, 
1900-1985 (Carbondale, Illinois, 1987), p. 8. 
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practical, is a method of teaching reading and writing that concerns itself primarily 
with the mechanics of language use in a manner suited to fulfilling basic skills 
acquisition in required courses. James Berlin calls it the ‘triumph of the scientific and 
technical world-view’ in the writing classroom, which was created within the confines 
of newly developing elective American universities to address the needs of the 
emerging meritocracy of American society.23 As it emulates a scientifically positivist 
outlook on knowledge, it is also readily amenable to being methodised, with the result 
that generations of writing courses and textbooks systematically teach writing as a 
process of error correction and formulaic discourse representing differing modes of 
communicating reality (exposition, narration, description, etc.) in a methodologically 
logical manner. 
 The results of these teaching methods were widely criticised for making 
compositional teaching the drudge work of academia, for using rhetoric merely as a 
managerial tool of style and correctness, and for transforming reading and writing into 
instruments of hierarchical criticism (as good and bad writing can be judged using 
logical and transferable methods of correctness and conformity). As more socially-
epistemic views of reality and language became widespread, positivism lost its shine, 
and the American university faced a multicultural and multi-discoursed student body 
that was not adaptable to a method developed by and for an elite meritocracy. 
Current-traditional rhetoric, as a result, became the by-word for all that was wrong in 
                                                             
23 James A. Berlin, Writing Instruction in Nineteenth Century American Colleges 
(Carbondale, Illinois, 1984), p. 62. 
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writing instruction. When modern American compositionists became keen to uncover 
the roots of this pedagogy, the controversial works of Petrus Ramus soon emerged as 
the obvious starting point, with the works of the Scottish Common Sense school 
emerging as the transatlantic intermediary in this historical trajectory. 
 
Rhetoric, Ramus, and the Scottish Common-Sense School 
 Current-traditional rhetoric is strongly linked, by both its historical 
predecessors and its pedagogical results, with the practice of objective criticism. As 
many literary historians have argued, literary criticism as we know it is a descendant 
of the movement of Belles lettres that originated in Scotland in the eighteenth century, 
also closely affiliated with the Scottish Common Sense School.24 Scottish Common 
Sense Philosophy is one whose eighteenth-century thinkers had as a first premise that 
the human mind can perceive truths that are self-evident, perceptions that are prior to 
reason, education or experience, and common to all persons. To a large extent the 
Scottish Common Sense position arose from Thomas Reid's (1710-1796) counter to 
the scepticism and idealism of the more dominant Enlightenment philosophers Hume 
                                                             
24 See Franklin E. Court, Institutionalising English Literature: The Culture and 
Politics of Literary Study, 1750-1990 (Stanford, Connecticut, 1992); and Franklin E. 
Court, The Scottish Connection: The Rise of English Literary Study in Early America 
(Syracuse, New York, 2001); Robert Crawford, Devolving English Literature 
(Oxford/New York, 1992; repr. Edinburgh, 2000); and Robert Crawford (ed.), The 
Scottish Invention of English Literature (Cambridge, 1998 and 2008). 
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and Berkeley. For Reid, the sceptical empiricist's claim that one can't infer the 
existence of anything else from the impressions and perceptions of one's own  mind  
is  utterly  unsatisfactory:  “upon  this hypothesis, the whole universe about me, 
bodies and spirits, sun, moon, stars, and earth, friends and relations, all things without 
exception, which I had imagined to have a permanent existence whether I had 
imagined them or not, vanisheth at once.”25 What he calls “common sense” falls not 
into the category of reason, but of “first principals,” of which he argues that “the 
evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the necessary 
relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of evidence, equally grounded in 
our constitution.”26 Deeply realist, then, the notion of “common sense” formed a 
position that could account for a world that exists in common whether a human mind 
acknowledges it or not, but whose existence, principals, and concepts are accessible to 
all. This philosophy appealed greatly to those in the Scottish universities who were 
unwilling to accept the implications of scepticism, most particularly upon religious 
principals. What I am here calling the Scottish Common Sense School are those 18th 
century thinkers and teachers who used Common Sense philosophy to ground their 
work in all areas. One of the areas of the greatest success, and longevity, of Common 
Sense thinking was that of rhetoric. 
 The rhetorics of Common Sense authors, Hugh Blair (1718-1800), George 
Campbell (1719-1796), and Richard Whatley (1787-1863), were very much a part of 
the rise of the culture of belles lettres in the English-speaking world. As a part of the 
                                                             
25 Reid, Thomas. An Inquiry into the Human Mind. p.4. 
26 Ibid. p. 49. 
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method of belletristic reading, rhetoric became primarily a faculty of criticism, the 
analysis, classification, and judgement of texts, both practical and prescriptive. 
Belletrism and literary criticism made its way across the Atlantic by means of the 
Blair, Campbell, and Whately's popular rhetorical textbooks, and current-traditional 
rhetoric is seen as a development resulting from this process of dissemination. Since 
Berlin's history of current-traditional rhetoric,27 the historical argument connecting the 
writings of Hugh Blair and his Common Sense colleagues to its rise in the United 
States has been repeated too often to enable complete a listing here, but can be seen in 
the works of Edward P.J. Corbett, Robert J. Connors, Janice M. Lauer, Thomas M. 
Conley, and James Herrick.28 
 Of the three Common Sense rhetoricians noted above, by far the most 
influential in the United States was Hugh Blair, whose Rhetoric and Belles lettres 
alone went through over 50 re-printings, and was still being assigned as a class text as 
late as 1911.29 The influence of Blair's profession of Common Sense realism is often 
used as an indication of his positivistic view of the rhetorical arts, and the subsequent 
                                                             
27 James Berlin, Rhetoric and Reality. 
28 Edward P. J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (New York, 1965); 
Robert J. Connors, Composition-Rhetoric: Backgrounds, Theory, and Pedagogy 
(Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1997); Janice M. Lauer, Invention in Composition and 
Rhetoric (West Lafayette, Indiana, 2004), Thomas M. Conley, Rhetoric in the 
European Tradition (Chicago, 1990); James Herrick, The Radical Rhetoric of the 
English Deists: The Discourse of Skepticism, 1680-1750 (South Carolina, 1997). 
29 Berlin, Rhetoric and Reality, p. 2. 
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development of criticism as the primary approach to both reading and rhetoric. 
 The Professor of Rhetoric and Belles lettres at the University of Edinburgh, 
Blair was an incredibly important academic and culture figure in his own lifetime in 
his native Scotland as part of the Scottish Enlightenment, but also through his printed 
works into the rest of the English speaking world. The multiple strands of politics, 
philosophy, economy, and culture that made up the Enlightenment converged in the 
Scottish universities in such as way as to form a powerful new way of teaching 
rhetoric and literature, arguably creating the academic field of English Literature.30  
Belles lettres, the study of the writings of culture and polite society, became the focus 
of Scottish literature and language departments: in opposition to Oxford and 
Cambridge (where literary teaching continued solely to constitute Greco-Roman 
classical texts), the Scottish universities attempted to acculturate students by 
incorporating examples of genius from contemporary authors as well. Blair was a 
central figure in the new rhetoric of critical taste that incepted this creation, because 
although he and Campbell were ‘deeply and honestly interested in producing ideas as 
sound and as current as possible, their chief desire was to produce graduates who 
would not be sneered at by the likes of Lord Chesterfield’.31  In other words, educated 
Scots in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were keenly aware of their need to 
appropriate the forms and features of English high society, in order to raise their place 
in the burgeoning British Empire. 
                                                             
30 Robert Crawford, 'Scottish Literature and English Studies', in The Scottish Invention 
of English Literature, pp. 225-246, at p. 225. 
31 Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition, p. 217. 
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 It is clear from Blair’s publications and their reception that he did indeed 
popularise the belletristic study of literature, and that much of this is ascribed to his 
teaching on ‘taste’ as the cultivatable faculty of criticism. ‘Taste’, as it forms parts of 
the critical tradition, is seen as the hinge between the push for cultural conformity 
with discourses of power and the evolution of literary studies to literary criticism, 
provided by the same impulse to elitism and a positivistic epistemological framework. 
S. Michael Halloran tells us that ‘much of great value was lost in the evolution from 
the neo-classical rhetoric of the late 18th century to the composition course of the late 
19th...in place of the rich array of stylistic forms and techniques was the flat voice of 
mechanical corrections’ and that this was due largely to the fact that the rhetorical 
virtue of eloquence shifted to a new ideal of taste, which tended ‘to shift standards of 
judgement from a complex domain combining the moral, aesthetic, and the pragmatic 
to a more purely aesthetic one’.32 However, Linda Ferreira-Buckley, Winifred Horner, 
                                                             
32 S. Michael Halloran. ‘From Rhetoric to Composition: The Teaching of Writing in 
America to 1900’ in James J. Murphy (ed.) A Short History of Writing Instruction 
from Ancient Greece to twentieth-century Century America (Davis, California, 1990), 
p.89. However, in his ‘Introduction’ to Hugh Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles 
lettres co-written with Linda Ferriera-Buckley, Halloran modifies this view 
somewhat, noting that Blair and his contemporaries ‘took Quintillian as their model, 
and … that their work has more in common with his program of forming citizen-
orators than with the narrowly circumscribed remnant to be found in the late-
nineteenth century textbooks of A.S. Hill and John F Genung’; Hugh Blair, Lectures 
on Rhetoric and Belles lettres, ed. Linda Ferreira-Buckely and S. Michael Halloran 
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and Barbara Warnick33 have all offered careful readings of Blair and the Common 
Sense idea of ‘taste’ that have increasingly challenged the interpretation of the critical 
tradition as opposed to rhetoric. Notwithstanding these nuanced examinations, 
however, Blair’s concern with taste is still largely historicised as an indicator of the 
positivistic aesthetic elitism that was the groundwork for the later tyranny of current-
traditional rhetoric. 
 What was Blair’s own definition of taste? He argued that it should be defined 
as: 
‘The power of receiving pleasure from the beauties of nature and of art’ ...hence the 
faculty by which we relish such beauties seems more nearly allied to the feeling of 
                                                             
(Carbondale, Illinois, 2005), p. xlix. 
33 Winifred Bryan Horner, Nineteenth Century Scottish Rhetoric: The American 
Connection (Carbondale, Illinois, 1993): Barbara Warnick, The Sixth Canon: 
Belletristic Rhetoric and Its French Antecedents (Columbia,1993); Linda Ferreira-
Buckley, ‘Writing instruction in Great Britain: The Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries’, in Murphy (ed.), A Short History of Writing Instruction (2nd edn, 
Mahwah, New Jersey, 2001); Linda Ferreira-Buckley, ‘Constructing Histories of 
Composition Studies in America’, Composition Studies, 26/2 (1998): pp. 97-112; 
Linda Ferreira-Buckley, ‘“Scotch knowledge” and the Formation of Rhetorical Studies 
in 19th-Century England’, In Lynee Lewis Gaillet (ed.), Scottish Rhetoric and its 
Influences (Mahwah, New Jersey, 1998); Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric, Ferreira-
Buckley and Halloran, “Introduction”. 
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sense, than to a process of understanding...yet reason, as I shall show hereafter, assists 
taste in many of its operations, and serves to enlarge its power.34 
 
By Blair’s definition, then, the faculty of taste is an internal ‘power’ of response to 
nature and art. He carefully distinguishes it from reason: ‘Reason is a very general 
term; but if we understand by it, that power of the mind which in speculative matters 
discovers truth, and in practical matters judges the fitness of means to an end…than 
Taste is not resolvable into any such operation of Reason.’35 It is clear from Blair’s 
work that taste itself is not a faculty of criticism; it is one of reception and mediation 
between the internal and external senses. Reason does, however, serve to ‘assist’ and 
‘enlarge’ this faculty. This is an essential distinction to the critique of Ramism and 
Common Sensism’s historicisation as continuous organs of the ideologies of 
positivism. 
 While the genealogical and ideological connection between what became 
current-traditional rhetoric and Common Sense rhetoric was increasingly named and 
identified, U.S. Compositionists continued to look back to even older rhetorical roots, 
and Petrus Ramus was grafted into this narrative. Ramus was presented, in a neat 
march through history, as a fitting antiquarian anti-hero for his removal of invention 
from rhetoric to logic, and as the link between scholastic logic and empirical reason: 
in sum, as the father of modern positivism. Here is how the most widely used 
rhetorical history textbook in U.S. graduate seminars today sums up Ramus’ method: 
                                                             
34 Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric, Ferreira-Buckely and Halloran, p. 10 
35 Ibid. p.10. 
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 By subjecting cultural studies to a supposedly universalising method, Ramus 
seemed to strip cultural artifacts of their culture-bound qualities. He had no use for 
historical knowledge. In practice, this meant that appreciation of the objects of 
humanist study no longer required that one be steeped in a particular historical, 
philosophical, or religious perspective. The method purported to give rational beings 
of all ages and conditions access to the great works of the human intellect—now 
timeless, though once originating in a particular time and place. People could gain 
from the humanities whatever they need for their own individual, private affairs.36 
 How this could be the source of what became an elitist method of criticism 
requires very little intuition on anyone’s part. Ramus is considered the patriarch of the 
method of universal criticism that requires only reason as the faculty by which to see. 
In other words, Walter Ong’s interpretation of Ramus as the proponent of a dyadic 
relationship between logic and truth still holds as the popular conception of Ramus’ 
contribution to post-Renaissance rhetorical history.37 
 Neil  Rhodes  notes  that  because  Ramus  is  seen  as  the  pivotal  turning  
point  from humanism to the humanities, he is also ‘responsible for the transition from 
rhetoric to criticism’,38 and in the U.S. tradition this is taken to mean that Hugh Blair 
                                                             
36 Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Hertzberg, 'Peter Ramus', in The Rhetorical Tradition 
(1990 edn), p. 560. 
37 Walter Ong, in Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, p. 288. 
38 Neil Rhodes, ‘From Rhetoric to Criticism’ in Crawford (ed.) The Scottish Invention 
of English Literature (2008 edn), p. 26. 
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and the influence of Common Sense rhetoric finished, or at least advanced, Ramus’ 
rhetorical project. While this is not the place to give a historical examination of the 
influence of Ramism on Scottish Common Sense philosophy, there are many 
precursory levels at which this genealogy works. From a historical perspective, Blair 
and the Common-Sense realists enter onto a scene already deeply influenced by 
Ramist dialectic, although very little has been written about their relationship. 
Elizabethanne Boran tells us that at Trinity College Dudley Fenner's Ramist 
perspectives on dialectic and rhetoric ‘proved very popular with preachers who 
accepted logic and rhetoric as essential elements in evangelisation’,39 which was also 
an enterprise of the Scottish Common Sense school, and reminds us that it was the 
Scots who brought Ramism to Dublin. As has been detailed elsewhere, the same 
narrative applies to the first universities in the United States, and the Scottish 
Common Sense rhetorics of the eighteenth century reached a new U.S. academia 
already deeply influenced by Puritanical Ramism.40 As the Scottish Common Sense 
rhetorics became widely incorporated into the curriculum of departments already 
indebted to Ramism, the pedagogical projects of Ramistic and belletristic reading 
methods – simplification of method, and the development of universal pedagogical 
                                                             
39 Elizabethanne Boran, ‘Ramism in Trinity College in the Early Seventeenth 
Century’, in The Influence of Petrus Ramus, pp. 177-199, at p. 181. 
40 Perry Miller, The New England Mind: From Colony to Province (Harvard, 1954); 
Michael Moran, (ed.), Eighteenth Century British and American Rhetorics and 
Rhetoricians: Critical Studies and Sources (London, 1994). 
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reading and writing methods via logical textbooks, based on a realist epistemology of 
language and knowledge – complimented and continued one 41another in specific 
ways. 
 In addition to a historical continuity, the cultural exigencies of the development 
of Ramism and the Common Sense rhetorics are comparable. S. Michael Halloran 
tells us that in Blair’s time the shift from oratorical culture to prose composition 
studies was largely due to three movements: the emphasis on belletristic forms of 
writing; the emergence of the middle classes and professional classes in the student 
population; and technological developments that facilitated a heavier reliance on 
writing.42 I suggest that these same factors existed during Ramus’ lifetime. As Erland 
Sellberg points out, for Ramists in Sweden supporting ‘usefulness’ was encouraging 
the training of bureaucrats and statesmen, and thus the impact of Ramism was not 
only theoretical, but practical for the newly-emerging political state. This, also, was 
the case in Blair’s day, and he too wrote textbooks for a new pedagogical system that 
was interested in producing citizens and statesmen, in a time of a dramatic political 
change towards modern democracy. Of course, the newly-formed U.S. system of 
education and statesmanship is inexorably entwined with the same exigencies, and on 
the whole with the Scottish Common Sense school and Enlightenment, to such an 
                                                             
41 S. Michael Halloran, ‘From Rhetoric to Composition: The Teaching of Writing in 
America to 1900’, in Murphy (ed.), A Short History of Writing Instruction, p. 156. 
42 Erland Sellberg, ‘The Usefulness of Ramism’ in The Influence of Petrus Ramus, pp. 
107-126, at p. 124. 
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extent that more recent studies argue for a view of Enlightenment history as not a set 
of ideas but ‘as an integral part of transatlantic networks of exchange-of ideas, people, 
and commodities’.43 
 Theoretical   and   philosophical   similarities   between   Ramist   rhetoric   and   
Scottish Common-Sense rhetoric have also been suggested in light of their later 
pedagogical fruits. Sharon Crowley, in her paradigm-shifting examination of current-
traditional rhetoric, The Methodological Memory, tells us that the current-traditional 
method: 
… prefers the discursive movement from generalisation to specification; it 
concentrates on expository discourse; it recommends that the inventional scheme 
devised for exposition be used in any discursive situation; and it translates invention 
out of the originating mind and onto the page. In other words, this 
rhetoric assumes that the process of invention can be graphically displayed in 
discourse.44  
Clearly there is a profound philosophical and logical relationship between the current-
traditional practice of teaching the arts of language and Ramus’ logical method. 
Although Crowley tells us that ‘Ramus confined...method to the presentation of 
                                                             
43 Susan Manning and Francis D. Cogliano, ‘Introduction: The Enlightenment and the 
Atlantic’, in Susan Manning and Francis D. Cogliano (eds), The Atlantic 
Enlightenment (Aldershot, 2008), p. 17. 
44 Sharon Crowley, The Methodological Memory: Invention in Current-Traditional 
Rhetoric (Carbondale, Illinois, 1990), p. 13. 
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knowledge rather than its generation,’ she argues that it was a later development to 
find a method that was suited to invention.45 This later development was the work of 
Blair and his colleagues, whose belief in faculty psychology caused them to 
internalise the method in the mind of the individual. But Campbell and Blair’s use of 
faculty psychology to cause a turn towards internalisation made ‘taste’, as the faculty 
of criticism, a faculty of internal mediation of the self towards reality at the same time 
as it criticises and mediates itself. In the U.S. uptake of Scottish Common Sense 
philosophy via Blair’s work on rhetoric, this became positivistic criticism and 
rhetoric. But a foundational realism drawn into a movement of internal mediation and 
creating an individually internalised logical system did not develop into and terminate 
exclusively in current-traditional rhetoric. If the Scottish Common Sense school is 
indeed indebted to Ramism in its theoretical framework of realism and logical method 
for the purposes of individual mediation of the world, then it may be possible to see 
this debt and relationship in other branches of the outgrowth of Common Sensism. 
During the same period that saw the development of current-traditional rhetoric from 
the works of Scottish Common Sense rhetoric and logic, C.S. Peirce was reading 
Thomas Reid and Richard Whately for what he would later develop as his radical 
theories of pragmaticism and pragmatic logic. His theory of pragmatic method fits 
this genealogy in several striking ways. 
 
Charles Sanders Peirce and the Scottish Common-Sense School 
 
                                                             
45 Ibid., p. 36. 
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 Charles Sanders Peirce, a late nineteenth-century American logician, 
mathematician, and scientist, developed and articulated a semiotic understanding of 
meaning-making that closes off neither the subjectivity of the individual mind, the 
relationally and communal nature of knowing, or the acceptance of the actual realness 
of being. He was influenced from the earliest stages of his development by the 
Scottish Common Sense school, as Houser points out: ‘he [Pierce] claimed that from 
the age of twelve, after reading his brother’s copy of Whately’s Elements of Logic, he 
could no longer think of anything except as an exercise in logic.’46 In later years he 
often acknowledged his admiration for Common Sensism, marveling at the longevity 
of his ‘adhesion, under inevitable modification, to the opinion of the subtle but well-
balanced intellect, Thomas Reid.’47 Peirce’s pragmaticism has a specific debt to 
Scottish Common Sense philosophy, although this may seem contradictory in light of 
the divergent pedagogies Common Sense rhetoric and American pragmatism are 
customarily seen to produce.48 
 In his triadic theory of meaning, otherwise known as the theory of semiosis, 
                                                             
46 Nathan Houser,  ‘Introduction’, The Essential Peirce:  Selected  Philosophical  
Writings,  ed. Nathan Houser and Christian J. W. Kloesel (2 vols, Indiana, 1992) vol.1 
(1867-1893). 
47 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Critical Common-Sensism’, The Philosophical Writings of 
Peirce, ed. Justus Buchler (New York, 1955), p. 293. 
48See John Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic Realism: A Study of Peirce’s 
Relation to Duns Scotus (Seattle, 1963). 
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Peirce describes a dynamic relationship of things as signs and the mind that perceives 
them. While this is not the place to fully delineate Peirce’s systematic philosophy of 
triadic semiotic mediation, it is sufficient for our purposes to note that it is the 
mediation of the third, or the interpretant in the semiotic process, that allows for a 
position which accounts for a real world, a reasonable method, and a fully individual 
interpretation. All of rhetoric and logic, language, in fact our senses and reason itself, 
is in this Peircean world a third. This meditational process is a tool, like Blair’s ‘taste’ 
for reflexivity and the creation or invention of knowledge.49 
 What Peirce’s semiotic process indicates is the grounds for a universality of 
method within semiosis. Like Ramistic method, the work of semiosis is one of 
recognising distinctions within our logical processes of meaning; for Peirce, the 
method of our semiotic process is based on the habits of interpretation we develop as 
we distinguish things by their results. Although Peirce only ever references Ramus’ 
work peripherally in his own writings,50 Roberta Kevelson points out that Peirce’s 
method in its fundamental mathematical conception follows Ramus, in that it brings 
‘together logic and rhetoric in the domain of Method’.51 Moreover, like Peirce, she 
                                                             
49It is essential here to note that Peirce’s concept of fallibility precludes the possibility 
of any knowledge made being fully true in the sense that it is complete and without 
error. 
50 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘A Guess at the Riddle’, The Essential Peirce, vol. 1, 
pp.245-280, at p. 247. 
51 Roberta Kevelson, Charles S. Peirce’s Method of Method (Amsterdam, 1987), p. 
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tells us, ‘to Ramus it was not the picture in the mind that was true, but the rule of 
logic that “ensures that all the precepts displayed…are true,”’52 which is the 
formulation of Peircean metaphysics as well.53  Peirce declares that the method of 
pragmatic logic ‘requires that in reasoning we should be conscious, not only of the 
conclusion, and of our deliberate approval of it, but also of its being the results of the 
premise from which it results, and furthermore that the inference is one of a possible 
class of inferences which conform to one guiding principle.’54 Here is a flexible 
methodology, like Ramistic method, based on a logical system that consists of a 
process of seeing the effects of precepts forward and backward. Peirce’s explanation 
of syllogistic logic thus imitates Ramus closely.55 The third, or the interpretant in 
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53 Peirce has this to say: ‘It is certainly very doubtful whether a conclusion – as 
something existing in the mind independently, like an image – suddenly displaces two 
premises existing in the mind in a similar way. But it is a matter of constant act from 
the conclusion and say that it is true. Something, therefore, takes places within the 
organism which is equivalent to the syllogistic process.’ Charles Sanders Pierce, 
‘Some Consequences experience, that if a man is made to believe in the premises, in 
the sense that he will also be ready to of the Four Incapacities’, The Essential Peirce, 
vol. 1, pp. 28-56, at pp. 30-31. 
54 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Critical Common-Sensism’, The Philosophical Writings of 
Peirce, ed. Buchler, pp. 290-302, at p. 293. 
55 Manley Thompson, The Pragmatic Philosophy of C.S. Peirce (Chicago, Illinois, 
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Peirce’s triadic semiosis, is only possible by our rational process of moving from 
generalities to specifics. Peirce explains: 
Reference to an interpretant is rendered possible and justified by that which renders 
possible and justifies comparison. But that is clearly the diversity of impressions. If 
we had but one impression, it would not require to be reduced to unity, and would 
therefore not need to be thought of as referred to an interpretant, and the conception 
of reference to an interpretant would not arise. But since there is a manifold of 
impressions, we have a feeling of complication or confusion, which leads us to 
differentiate this impression from that, and then, having been differentiated, they 
require to be brought to unity. Now they are not brought to unity until we conceive 
them together as being ours, that is, until we refer them to a conception as their 
interpretant. Thus, the reference to an interpretant arises upon the holding together of 
diverse impressions.56 
 Thus, while only diversity makes our distinctions possible in the first place (a 
crucial hinge to Dewey’s later pluralistic rhetoric), the creation of the interpretant is 
through finding a generality. Of course, in Ramus’ system, as Roland MacIlmaine 
tells us, ‘The form and methode which is kept in this arte, comaundethe that the thing 
which is absolutely most clear, be first placed, and so forth with the rest. And 
therefore continually procedethe from the general to the special and singular.’57 This 
                                                             
1953) p. 1-13. 
56 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘A New List of Categories’, section 10, Proceedings of the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences 7 (1868), pp. 287-98, at p. 298. 
57 MacIlmaine, Logike, Dunn, p. 6. 
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movement of the general to the singular is the philosophical result, or the cause (I am 
not certain which came first in Ramus’ thinking) of his inversion of inventio and 
dispositio, as he considered it more natural to logic to proceed from the topics of 
discourse to their arrangement, which also respects the order of hierarchical necessity. 
Ramus says that: ‘there are two universal, general gifts bestowed upon man, Reason 
and Speech; dialectic is the theory of the former, grammar and rhetoric of the latter. 
Dialectic should therefore draw on the general strengths of human reason in 
consideration of their subject matter…’58 Because Ramus gives into dialectic the 
language arts of invention, arrangement, and memory, he produces in his followers 
(who used language for truth-telling) a method of objective-truth derivation: language 
can be used to represent real things, as it is distilled from our logical apprehension of 
real generals and real specifics. It is precisely this inversion, then, that makes the aim 
of Ramus’ method testing the truth in language, as opposed to the aim in classical 
rhetoric of finding the probable. 
 Pragmaticism, however, does deal precisely with the probable. ‘It is the reality 
of some possibilities,’ Peirce declares, ‘that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist 
upon.’59 How can these two logical systems, based as they are on such 
methodological and epistemological similarity, diverge at this critical juncture? The 
probable, in Peircean pragmatism, is of absolute importance because the universals 
                                                             
58 Petrus Ramus,  ‘Arguments  in  Rhetoric  Against  Quintillian’,  in  Patricia  Bizzell  
and  Bruce  Herzberg  (eds),  The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical 
Times to the Present (Boston, 1990; 2nd edn 2001), pp. 563-583, at p. 566. 
59 Peirce, ‘Critical Common-Sensism’, p. 300. 
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are apprehended by the observation of their results in action. Pragmatic method is 
concerned with what is and what could be as the indicators of any universal 
knowledge or method—the probable is the foundation of knowledge because 
knowledge is necessarily created in dynamic action.  This follows closely the 
Common Sense vision of knowledge and logic, for like pragmaticism, Common 
Sense universals are observed according to their results (for instance, on our faculties 
of apprehension). However, it may be that from an epistemological standpoint the 
probable is not such a divergence between Ramus’ and Peirce’s logical method. For 
Peirce, we move from the general to the specific because everything that is is already 
in motion, and the phenomena we observe in specifics are already mediations. For 
Ramus, ‘the cause is that by whose force the thing is: and therefore this first place of 
invention is the fountain of all sciences: for that matter is known perfectly, whose 
cause is understood.’ The cause, therefore, is what pushes a thing to be manifested as 
it is in the real world, and like Peirce and the Scottish Common Sense philosophers, 
Ramus argues that language is instantiation of a cause becoming itself as it 
instantiates its mediation. To all three there are profound moral dimensions to the use 
of logic and language. Even though dialectic (as it pertains to reason) and speech (as 
it pertains to rhetoric) are separated in Ramus’ logical system, nevertheless even he 
declares ‘in use these should be united, so that the same oration can expound purely, 
speak ornately, and express thought wisely’.60 They must be separate, therefore, 
because to distinguish and make visible is how we learn, not how dialectic and 
                                                             
60 Ramus, ‘Arguments in Rhetoric Against Quintillian’, p. 566. 
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rhetoric manifest in the world, nor how we actually use them. 
 The significance of the methodological overlap between Peirce and Ramus 
should not be underestimated, especially in relation to the pedagogical projects that 
have been produced by Pragmatic rhetoric, which are to a great extent the 
epistemological and methodological opposites of current-traditional rhetoric. While 
current-traditional rhetoric, as an offshoot of Ramist influences, created a pedagogy 
rooted in criticism and ‘concerned about the quality of authorial minds’61 with all of 
its overtones of elitism and positivism, Pragmatic rhetoric became the bedrock of 
socially-epistemic rhetorical practice which maintains individuals while accounting 
for a practice of pluralism. 
 
Ramus, Current-Traditional Rhetoric, and Peircean Pragmaticism: Similarities 
and Differences 
 Finally, there are three important areas of interrelationship connecting Peirce to 
the nexus of Ramus and the Scottish Rhetorics. First, all three, as forms of 
specifically Christian realism, point to the fact that everything that is, is of a 
representative nature. Peter Sharrat tells us that Ramus ‘adopts the Christian synthesis 
of neo-Platonism and the gospel...he manages to combine that idea that reality, as we 
think we know it, is once removed from true reality, and art is twice removed, with 
the idea that art and philosophy somehow bring out the universals in nature’.62 Peirce 
                                                             
61 Crowley, Methodological Memory, p. 13. 
62 Peter Sharratt, “Peter Ramus and Imitation, Sign and Sacrament” in Yale French 
Studies, 47 (1972): pp. 19-32, at p. 27. 
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tells us that everything that is capable of being represented is itself representative and 
that we represent through semiotic mediation. Second, all three transpose this notion 
into a universal method for seeing distinctions, differences, and organising our 
response to them. Ramus purports his method of logical deduction; Common Sensism 
gives us the development of taste and sensibility as a mediated method of knowing 
and responding; and Peirce delivers what would become in the hands of James and 
Dewey the ‘experimental method’ of allowing what something does to define what it 
is, in which contextual knowledge brings us directly back to the open hand of 
rhetoric. And the third similarity is that they all make the specific human faculty of 
reason, in its capacity to distinguish, the means of logical mediation between nature, 
self, and society. 
 An important difference to bear in mind is that Blair's project was in specific 
response to Empiricism, and is thus distinct from Ramus in its emphasis on emotion 
and experience in conjunction with the real and the social. Brian Short tells us that 
Scottish Common Sense rhetoric’s ‘genius is...for psychologising traditional tropes 
and giving them a force which transcends not only the canon of style, their classical 
locus, but the boundary which separates rhetoric from epistemology and moral 
philosophy’.63  It is this movement, which privileges a single mind and thus sees texts 
as the reflection of the working of an authorial mind, that Sharon Crowley argues is 
the foundation for rhetoric based. However, this which is also expressed in Peirce’s 
                                                             
63 Brian Short, ‘Figurative Language and the Scottish New Rhetoric’, in Language 
Sciences, 22/3 (2000): pp. 251-264, at p. 256. 
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triadic dynamism, also accounts for an epistemology and moral philosophy that 
moves inwards and outwards, incorporating as it judges and mediates—a practice that 
is at once socially-epistemic and methodologically logical. Realistic method does not, 
in the end, lead exclusively to scientific positivism with all of the concurrent pitfalls 
of criticism. If, as Catherine Dunn suggests, Ramus’ method were seen as a ‘useful 
tool for demonstration, rather than a science of human reason’, then the ideological, 
philosophic, and historical continuities between Ramus, Scottish Common Sense 
rhetoric, and Peircean pragmatic method would be united, by virtue of the fact that 
they all methodise to find truth in a way that assumes a universal method based on a 
realistic view that is not itself dyadic or positivistic. 
Conclusion 
 
 What this chapter has shown is that the ideological trajectory from Ramistic 
method to current traditional rhetoric, via the Scottish Common Sense school, is 
significantly complicated by the debt that Peircean pragmatic method (and by 
extension, American pragmatism) owes to Common Sense rhetorical and logical 
epistemology of language; and the readily visible methodological overlaps in turn 
between Ramistic and Pragmatic method. All three schools of method share a 
philosophically realist premise in which logic is specifically oriented to action— in 
Ramus, to the action of making visible the logical system of invention within 
language, in Peirce and the Scottish Common Sense thinkers to a final concern for 
civic and social interaction through one’s reflexive mediation of reality through 
language. The broader philosophical implications of this argument is the re-evaluation 
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of the current assumption that logic, if it is based on a realist  premise,  necessarily  
removes  rhetoric  from  any  function  other  than  the managerial and perfunctory. 
 As a final thought, at this juncture in the study of rhetorical theory and history, 
we might see this observation as a move to the post-critical; and one in which all 
methods of knowledge-making can be viewed, not as controversial or condemnable 
lapses into antiquated systems of philosophy, but as useful and inclusive tools to 
mediated knowing in a mediated world. 
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This paper offers re-assessment of Scottish Common Sense rhetoric and its 
relationship to pluralist practice and philosophical method. It argues that the rhetorical 
texts of George Campbell, Hugh Blair, and Alexander Bain can be read as a practical 
application of Scottish Common Sense philosophy. This offers a novel means of 
examining the relationship that Scottish rhetoric has to the philosophy of David Hume 
and also its own innovative philosophy of language. Finally, I argue that Scottish 
rhetoric makes a unique contribution to rhetorical methodology’s key place in the 
creation of social and moral consensus. 
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Preface 
 This journal article was expanded from a paper delivered at the Center for the 
Study of Scottish Philosophy at Princeton Theological Seminary, in response to a call 
for papers examining the “Scottish Common Sense Philosophy and the Natural Law 
Tradition in America.” The conference was a part of the celebration for the 
bicentennial of the PTS, and my paper won the “George Elder Davies Prize for Best 
Graduate Paper.” I was informed by the conference organizer that my paper won 
because the peer-reviewers agreed that among the submissions it best pointed out 
genuinely new directions for philosophical inquiry within the field. Rhetorical theory 
and its relationship to the philosophical tradition is a lesser-studied branch of Scottish 
philosophy, and this paper approaches the “natural law” tradition from the rhetorical 
standpoint. Perhaps more than the other two manuscripts included in this dissertation, 
this manuscript represents more the promise of new angles of inquiry than a fully 
elaborated argument. Its close reading of the rhetorical texts for the re-interpretation of 
their epistemological foundations is certainly unusual in traditional criticism of 
Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, and demonstrates the advantages of 
interdisciplinary study and methodological background in English literature and 
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TEXT 
 
 The philosophical heritage of Scottish rhetoric has been in a contested state for 
some time. Some, such as Janice Lauer, claim that ‘its purpose was not to investigate 
or create, but rather to organize and present arguments through moral reasoning and 
empirical evidence.’1 Others, such as Thomas Conley, interpret it more for its role in 
the eighteenth-century project of social mobility: 
 
 Both Campbell and Blair…stood stolidly in the tradition of rhetorics designed 
to transform students into gentlemen . . . If both were intent on incorporating recent 
advances in philosophy into their conceptions of what rhetoric was and how rhetorics 
ought to be composed, both were nevertheless mainly concerned with initiating youth 
into the beau mode of belles lettres, as it were.2 
 
Most rhetorical criticism interprets Campbell’s and Blair’s rhetorical work as a largely 
derivative synthesis of new Enlightenment philosophical methods and the classical 
Latin rhetorical works of Cicero and Quintillian, with enough Common Sense realism 
and French belles lettres to make them broadly applicable as prescriptive classroom 
texts, dictating style and taste for many decades. These interpretations all have their 
grounding. However, I argue that if Scottish rhetoric is read as a theorized practice of 
Scottish Common Sense philosophy, it can be interpreted as far more rhetorically 
innovative and morally farsighted than these contemporary interpretations allow. Far 
from following basic Enlightenment philosophy of mind but inserting a Common 
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Sense epistemology to the detriment of any substantial rhetorical renovation, I put 
forward that Campbell and Blair, and the Common Sense school of which they are a 
part, create an insightfully inventive theory of language and its use. This new Common 
Sense philosophy of language reunites Logic and Rhetoric, which had been separated 
in Protestant teaching since the work of Petrus Ramus. They do this via a rhetorical 
theorization of Common Sense philosophy’s realism in conjunction with Hume’s 
philosophy of mind. The realist vision of language that emerges from the rhetorics of 
George Campbell, Hugh Blair, and, later, Alexander Bain, presents an understanding 
of language in which verbal communication – by virtue of its unique place in human 
reasoning – is recursive, and therefore progressive; relational, therefore social in its 
inception and product; natural, thus subject to universal laws; and finally, perhaps 
most importantly of all, is inherently a method, or praxis of inquiry and knowing. I 
suggest broadly that their rhetorical method, far from being a historical phenomenon 
limited to its historical contexts, may be more useful if seen as philosophical praxis 
that can be examined by its philosophical, pedagogical, and conceptual productions. 
These productions are multiple, often contradictory to one another, and continue to the 
present day. Further, the rhetorical theory presented in this reading of Hume, 
Campbell, Blair, and Bain clearly articulates the juncture between moral education, 
civil and civic conversation, personal and public virtue, and the means of creating the 
kinds of moral consensus necessary to religiously plural societies. 
 First it must be noted that the outcomes or possibilities of Scottish rhetoric’s 
facilitative roles in moral consensus are historically seen far later than the 
Enlightenment and Victorian time periods that produced them. It is beyond the scope 
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of this paper to do more than point to the conceptual frames at work in the rhetorical 
theories; further work would be needed to outline their linkages to latter inceptions of 
religious and moral pluralities.3 The arguable claim here is that Scottish rhetoric 
conceptually anticipated the need to address a secular or religiously plural state. Stated 
conversely, in Scottish rhetoric was found a serviceable way to address this need as it 
did arise.4 
 The Scottish Common Sense rhetorical project offers a keen reinterpretation of 
Hume’s philosophy of mind by articulating a more exact role of sentiment, sympathy, 
and feeling in the social processes of belief and judgment. Campbell’s Philosophy of 
Rhetoric (1776) especially performs this work, although it is widely interpreted as so 
derivative of Hume’s and Reid’s ideas that its original contributions to rhetorical 
theory are often overlooked. Lloyd Bitzer tells us that ‘In Hume’s Treatise, and in the 
later works which dressed up the doctrines of that work, are to be found the principal 
theories found in Campbell, the major exception being the view of common sense 
truths,  surely  developed in Campbell’s discussions with Thomas Reid.’5 Indeed, 
Campbell’s reputation for contributing to the Common Sense philosophical project 
rests more on the influence of the Rhetoric as a widely-used textbook in the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century classroom than on his original philosophical 
thinking. Marc Hanvelt, in The Politics of Eloquence (2012), follows Arthur Waltzer’s 
and Lloyd Bitzer’s evaluation that, appropriating Hume, George Campbell’s art of 
rhetoric is making language use best resemble sense impression.6 Hume’s own 
theories of rhetoric are grounded in his philosophy of the mind, as he wrote 
surprisingly very little explicitly on a co-extensive philosophy of language or 
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rhetorical theory.7 It has been argued that George Campbell’s work is as close as one 
may come to extrapolating Hume’s philosophy of mind into a coherent rhetorical 
theory.8 Hume, of course, placed judgment and persuasion in the arena of the 
understanding: the faculty of probable, or inductive, reasoning. Reason, on the 
contrary, is the realm of the direct, intuitive, and demonstrable. In a Humean system, 
therefore, rhetoric is not needed in the deductive reasoning processes, or any area of 
knowledge that is strictly logical (such as mathematics). This is in direct opposition to 
the Ramistic rhetorical systems, in which rhetoric is seen as precisely the tool for 
communicating, in the most logical manner, that what is logical. For Hume, Smith, 
Campbell, and Blair, rhetoric is returned to the art of the probable.9 The probable is 
also a central concept in Hume’s epistemology, and more importantly, in his idea of 
the social and moral. After all, dictated by the probable, custom is the ‘great guide of 
human life’ and ‘all inferences from experience, therefore, are the effects of custom, 
not of reasoning.’10 In the mental process, the ability to create the conditions of 
connection (resemblance, contiguity, and causation) are passionate (and sympathetic, 
in instances of communication) processes first and foremost. These alone inspire belief 
and motivate action. For Hume, judgment and belief arise from customary associations 
of lively impressions that produce a strong feeling in the mind – as opposed to 
perceptions of actual causality, faculties of sentiment are the motor of understanding. 
Hanvelt points out that for Hume rhetoric is therefore the art of making lively and 
vivid resemblances in order to induce belief, for ‘ratiocination’ and impression, or 
imagery, are basically one in the same.11 Rhetoric for Hume is thus a moral art for the 
discovery of belief and motivation based upon the probable, not a logical art for the 
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discovery of truth or falsehood based upon the reasonable. 
 George Campbell is happy to employ many, if not most, of these ideas in his 
philosophy of rhetoric.12 As Bitzer points out, in the Rhetoric Campbell cites Hume 
‘four times more often than Thomas Reid, five times more than Locke, and nearly 
three times more often than Bacon.’13 If, however, Campbell almost entirely and 
unquestioningly assimilates Hume’s epistemology in the Rhetoric, it would indicate 
either 1) a rather puzzling inconsistency in his own personal philosophical and 
religious belief (as he certainly did not accept Hume’s skeptical conclusions), or 2) a 
more innovative view of rhetoric than has previously been ascribed to him: one that 
explains and synthesizes Hume’s philosophy as proper to a philosophy of language 
and theory of rhetoric. This latter interpretation explains the discrepancy, as it confines 
Hume’s skeptical conclusions to the area of human capacity to which they are 
undeniably fitted.14 
 Campbell declares that while ‘belief commonly enlivens our ideas . . . vivacity 
of ideas is not always accompanied by faith, nor is faith always able to produce 
vivacity.’15 But, if indeed Hume and Campbell agree that rhetoric is making language 
use resemble sense impression, then Hume’s use of rhetoric to affect reason is 
ultimately more coherent than Campbell’s, and Campbell, as Hanvelt and Walzer point 
out, simply recreates the old idea that the art of rhetoric is one of the managerial 
purpose of making language more persuasive. A close reading of Campbell would 
indicate that his intentions are otherwise. 
 In his ‘Introduction’ to the Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell outlines his 
epistemic project for language: 
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‘Logic, whose end is the discovery of truth, is founded in the doctrine of the 
understanding: and ethics, (under which may be comprehended economics, politics, 
and jurisprudence) are founded in that of the will . . . but these are not the only arts 
which have their foundation in the science of human nature . . . there is no art 
whatever that has so close a connexion with all the faculties and powers of the mind, 
as eloquence, or the art of speaking, in the extensive sense in which I employ the term 
. . .’ 16 
He continues to elaborate the relationship between language and the human faculties: 
‘this study, properly conducted, leads directly to an acquaintance with ourselves: it not 
only traces the operations of the intellect and imagination, but discloses the lurking 
springs of action in the heart.’17 
 The science of language, therefore, is the science of the mind; deeper yet than 
the mind, it is the science of volition. Further, its method of knowing the mind is one 
of deduction from the close observance of language already in use. Campbell breaks 
this down into four steps, clearly announcing the fourth step as the place where his 
philosophy of rhetoric breaks with the old rhetorical traditions and offers something 
new. The first step in the ‘attainment of this art’ is to observe the ‘practical experience 
of mankind, which individuals, even in their rudest state, are capable of acquiring’ 
(that is, there is no human society or individual in which language is not operating at 
some level). The second is the beginning of the ‘critical science’ of observing which 
modes of speech and argument are employed for the ‘purposes of explaining, 
convincing, pleasing, moving, and persuading’; the third is to compare the effects, 
taking in circumstantial evidences. The fourth is to ‘canvass those principals in our 
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nature to which the various attempts are adapted, and by which, in any instance, their 
success or want of success may be accounted for’. This fourth and last step, he tells us, 
‘may be said to bring us into a new country, of which, though there have been some 
successful incursions occasionally made upon its frontiers, we are not yet in full 
possession.’18 While it may seem that the entire art of rhetoric is contained within 
steps one through three, the intervention of step four is to define the art of rhetoric as 
epistemic. In order to understand how to effectively use language, Campbell contends 
that one must understand how language use operates upon those ‘principals in our 
nature’ by which we understand, are pleased, are moved, are persuaded, and act. 
Alternatively, it could be said that in order to understand the principals of our nature, 
we may look to acquiring the arts of rhetoric. Language use, in Campbell’s estimation, 
does not serve to find the best ways to resemble sense impressions, as Hume indicates, 
nor does it offer tools to manipulate other minds through impressions, as sophistic 
rhetoric uses knowledge of the audience. Rather, it is both the form and the method of 
inquiring how the mind operates, as the means to directing operations of the mind. 
This is consonant with Reid’s contention that knowledge is not certain because it is 
infinite and our faculties finite: in Campbell’s scheme, rhetoric is safeguarded from the 
charge of sophism by the education of both the rhetor and the audience. All of the 
participants within a civil discourse should, to varying degrees, have the opportunity to 
learn the rhetorical arts, which coincides also with the formation of taste. And, of 
course, these means must be properly guarded by Christian virtues. Therefore, using 
and knowing human circumstances in conjunction with a ‘science of the mind’ is not a 
stable and permanent body of knowledge; rather it is a finite and fallible practice in 
 74  
which the listener and speaker have equal roles. 
 Campbell makes his reunion of logic and eloquence plain in Chapter IV: 
‘eloquence,’ he states, considers ‘not only the subject, but also the speaker and the 
hearers, and both the subject and the speaker for the sake of the hearers, or rather for 
the sake of the effect intended to be produced in them.’ Because of this, it unites an 
equal concern for truth and its effects. Logic is to rhetoric what the soul is to the body, 
what sense is to expression, that is, the animating principal.19 
 Grammar is the purely contextual managerial art; eloquence, in its fullest 
capacity, is the dynamic, flexible method of uniting sense to expression: via a science 
of the mind and a science of analyzing and using context. ‘Now’, Campbell explains, 
 
if it be by the sense or soul of the discourse that rhetoric holds of logic, or the art of 
thinking and reasoning, it by the expression or body of the discourse that she holds of 
grammar, or the art of conveying our thoughts in words of a particular language . . . 
The art of the logician is accordingly, in some sense, universal; the art of the 
grammarian is always particular and local.20 
 
But he has already established that this art of the logician is the art of thinking and 
reasoning and that this is not through inductive operations of the mind apart from 
sense but rather through the inductive process of seeing how the mind is already 
working by observing its uses (in language). The realist concept of rhetoric which 
emerges sees a universal, natural, common sense understanding of language use as 
refracting the use of language in the mind’s coming to know. It is a circular but not a 
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closed process,21 as the application (and similarly the inquiry, as it also is in language) 
is always through the infinite variety of the particular, local and contingent. 
 The purpose of the language faculty in the Common Sense rhetorical vision is 
moral and social: 
 
Reality or fact comprehends the laws and the works of nature, as well as the arts and 
institutions of men . . . by the first, we must acknowledge, when applied to things, and 
combined with the second, our researches into nature in a certain line are facilitated, 
the understanding is enlightened, and many of the arts, both elegant and useful, are 
improved and perfected. Without the aid of the second, society must not only suffer 
but also perish. Human nature itself could not subsist.22 
 
This practice of inquiry is also recursive: that is, it informs, perfects, and corrects both 
the faculties and their result as it operates for the purpose of both knowing in the first 
place and in the second using knowledge for the creation and betterment of the social 
and inter-relational realm. Hugh Blair develops and explains this as the rhetorical 
cultivation of taste. 
 Blair is most interested in how one uses rhetorical arts for the cultivation of 
taste as through this cultivation society can achieve moral understanding. He outlines 
his philosophy of language in the introduction to Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles 
lettres thus: 
 
 Speech is the great instrument by which man becomes beneficial to man: and it 
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is to the intercourse and transmission of thought, by means of speech, that we are 
chiefly indebted for the improvement of thought itself. Small are the advances which a 
single unassisted individual can make towards perfecting any of his powers. What we 
call human reason, is not the effort or ability of one, so much as it is the result of the 
reason of many, arising from lights mutually communicated, in consequence of 
discourse and writing.23 
 
In Blair’s particular and poetic explanation, taste and language are transactional, as by 
their practice they move between the individual’s innate faculties and capacities and 
the discourse, and therefore taste, of others. Blair makes very clear that like Campbell 
he places experience as the basis of this dynamic, and rules out a priori principles or 
deduction – ‘The rules of criticism are not formed by any induction a priori, they are 
not formed by a train of abstract reasoning, independent of facts and observations.’24 
But he also believed that the social episteme of taste was indeed from the given and 
universally shared foundation of human nature as created by God. Eloquence and taste 
are the reflexive tools that we use to access our universal love of the good and 
beautiful: ‘In every composition, what interests the imagination and touches the heart 
pleases all ages and nations. There is a certain string, to which, when struck, the 
human heart is so made as to answer.’25 Thus the problem, and possibility, of rhetoric 
increases its power as an ethical project in that it moves from the being only the 
vehicle of social and personal improvement to being the very context through which 
we create knowledge and experience truth. 
 When Blair declares that reason itself is the consequence of discourse and 
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writing, he gives a profound grounding to the necessity of educating the faculties of 
taste, that is, the capacity to be moved. Reason, while socially epistemic in Blair’s 
conceptualization, is not therefore dependent entirely on the whim and winds of social 
convention as it is made to respond to what is universally true. However, the filter – 
the transactional, relational parts in the mind and heart that mediate between the 
universal and the individual – is the faculty of taste, which is developed and cultivated 
through language use, and therefore is subject to social convention. The creation of 
social conventions through shared taste and language practice is an essential element 
of moral life. 
 From Campbell we get a clear picture of how the Common Sense Philosophy 
of Rhetoric diverges from previous theories of language, in its realist and 
methodological orientation; from Blair we see even more acutely how recursively 
social its foundation and its uses are. From Alexander Bain,26 we get a decisive 
philosophical articulation of the limitations of language, relative to its function in 
rationality. Bain’s underlying philosophy of language is very pragmatic, or, more 
fittingly, pragmaticist: he states that language is fundamentally limited by that fact that 
a word and a concept exist only in relationships that language has to allude to or 
assume. He calls this the ‘essential doubleness of knowledge, disguised by the forms 
of language.’27 By doubleness he is referring to ‘the fact that our mind works by 
contrast’,28 so Bain specifically refers to the rhetorical tool of antithesis – but 
doubleness just as well refers to the plurality of knowledge, to which he also refers. 
Bain, like Campbell and Blair, considers that rhetoric, as ‘knowledge of the persons 
addressed’,29 requires a complete ‘systematic scheme of man’s nature.’30 He is also 
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very lucid in elaborating the social-episteme of this knowledge. He delineates the tools 
of the rhetor as ‘the practical maxims acquired by men in the course of their education 
and experience, their principles of action, or rules of procedure trusted for gaining 
their ends, individual or social; these are the data of the orator, his medium of 
persuasion, the major premises of his reasonings.’31 This theory of rhetoric is deeply 
embedded in the contextual nature of human relations, and, more than an art applying 
itself to man, it is to a real degree the art of man, combining as it does ‘all the arts of 
strengthening or of loosening the bonds that cement ideas in the mind.32 For Bain, the 
‘essential plurality of knowledge’33 that he describes as the multiple and possibility 
infinite connections each person makes in their processes of knowing – occurring 
through distinction and contrast—cannot be represented in language. It is the essence 
of the art of rhetoric to find ways of creating in hearers the processes of knowing. 
 For the Scottish Common Sense rhetors, the project of understanding, 
applying, and teaching rhetoric was one and the same as the project of common sense: 
more than an extension of common sense philosophical principals, it is the practice of 
these principles. And it is moral practice, as it is directed at every stage toward 
creating our capacity as we understand and use that capacity. Its uniquely empirical 
realism accounts for a universal in the nature of humanity: we are universal language 
users, we deduce from our language use the way the mind operates. Further, we can 
deduce the ways we operate socially from the ways we can act upon one another 
through language. The mere fact of these natural functions is not enough to direct their 
usage in natural ways: because they only operate contextually (there is no language 
without a grammar, for instance), we must be educated to analyze and understand the 
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contexts in order to use the function, as we ourselves are within those contexts. There 
is no removal or abstraction from the fundamental reality of relationships, of contexts, 
of being within a dynamic. This human science of rhetoric is a unique marriage of the 
changeable and the same, and of the inductive and the deductive. Of course, for 
Campbell and Blair (less so for Bain and Hume) there is a final grounding in the 
ontology of being as Creation. However, its method requires no revelation to be either 
known or used. Its science is operationally secular, in the sense that, other than a 
warrant in the Creator, it refers to nothing outside of the nature of man as observed in 
and through his natural contexts. 
 Thomas Reid taught a special ‘12 o’clock class’ at Glasgow University, a class, 
Peter Diamond tells us, which was ‘devoted to the practical application of 
philosophy.’34 It is not a quaint eighteenth-century archaism that this instruction often 
turned to ‘eloquence’.35 I argue that rhetorical practice, in fact, is precisely the 
practical application of Reid’s philosophy, which is one reason the Common Sense 
school produced the multiple rhetorical textbooks successfully and extensively used 
throughout the English-speaking world for the next two hundred years. 
 Campbell tells us that, ‘On the most sublime of all sciences, theology and 
ethics, is built the most important of all arts, the art of living’ (Campbell 1776: lix). 
Reid’s idea of common sense, by his own admission, must be come to by the practice 
of virtue, as the ‘power of reflection’, while a natural power, only comes through 
development into maturity, and ‘to acquire this habit, is a work of time and labour’.36 
He appeals to ordinary language and to attention to language altogether as the proper 
first subject of deductive observation. Campbell’s correlation of language and the 
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workings of the mind directly follow Reid’s analysis in Essays on the Intellectual 
Powers of Man.37 Thus, of the first objects upon which to exercise the powers of 
reflection, language, like man’s other faculties, is found in an already working and 
dynamic state. Therefore, the study of language exercises both the habits of reflection 
and the practice of the art of living, once again, in a dynamic recursive relationship – 
they perfect as they inform one another. Virtue, in this knowledge economy, is also a 
recursive function that acts as both the beginning and end of the process, but it must be 
cultivated, practiced, reflected upon, learned. Like language, virtue is an action (even 
of attitude), oriented equally towards using and perfecting inner faculties and towards 
the social and outward effects. 
 The epistemic nature of language to reason in the Scottish Common Sense 
philosophy of language rests on the belief that they share with Hume in the centrality 
of emotion, feeling and sentiment in the processes of judgment. The strong emphasis 
on Eloquence, in both the philosophical systems and in the public teaching practices of 
Francis Hutcheson, Smith, Reid, and Blair, indicates clearly the essential importance 
of the language arts in the training of sentiment and sympathy and all that those terms 
invoke within their philosophical systems. Unlike Hume, however, the Common Sense 
thinkers distinguish between the means of knowing and what can be known – the 
rhetorical means to socially constructed knowledge: the creation of belief, and the 
structures of civil and personal customs of association, does not obviate the fact that 
truths do exist, even if we only know them through probable, finite, and imperfect 
means.38 There is no final skeptical conclusion in the Common Sense rhetorical vision, 
only an explanation of how, and why, our conclusions are always conditional and 
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fallible (and therefore, like in the Humean system, open to revision and expansion). 
 The history of the impact of the Common Sense rhetoric is perhaps 
inestimable. Whether or not citizens of English speaking countries went on to pursue 
higher educations and philosophical speculations, the rhetorical textbooks were used 
widely enough to have reached almost every educated person of several generations, 
informing and codifying language practices. But this had its drawbacks. As the century 
passed the dynamic rhetorical theory and language philosophy that informed these 
texts was lost in what became the prescriptive nature of rhetorical studies: the five 
paragraph essay, the positivist critical practices, the overwhelming attention to stylistic 
markers of taste and class. Scottish Common Sense Rhetoric, because of its realist 
orientation to universal truths, became the source of what is now called ‘current-
traditional rhetoric,’39 the teaching of language as an objective sign system. This, 
considered alongside Blair’s later reputation for crafting a project of ‘taste’ that 
resulted in an oligarchy of taste-makers, and the reputation of Scottish rhetoric, by the 
late twentieth century, was dismal and canonical. 
 There is another trajectory of Common Sense language theory, however, 
founded in the work of C.S. Peirce. I would argue that these two conceptual 
trajectories could not be farther apart, although they share a foundation. Peirce, who 
credits his childhood turn to philosophy to reading Richard Whately, and late in life 
admits that he never shook his love for the ‘old Scots’,40 created the method of ‘realist 
pragmatism’ via his concept of a triadic semiotic, which is nothing if not a recasting of 
rhetorical theory. His methods of abduction and semiotisis share Scottish rhetorics’ 
concern for both inner virtue and social morals; his ‘speculative rhetoric’ shares its 
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epistemological project. James Jacob Lizka reminds us that Peirce joins truth and 
inquiry: ‘by true is meant at that which inquiry aims’, and that ‘taken in these terms, 
formal rhetoric becomes the study of how to best adapt inquiry to achieve truth.’41 
Much could be said regarding Peirce’s ‘speculative rhetoric’ of ‘pragmaticism’, and 
how in the hands of his students and contemporaries, it became the American 
pragmatic school best known for its Progressive education (via Dewey) and its theory 
of pragmatic liberalism in politics. Suffice to comment that the legacies of Dewey’s 
progressivism couldn’t be further from the positivist language teaching credited to 
Common Sense rhetoric by Rhetoric and Composition studies today.42 
 Thus in America, on the one hand Scottish rhetoric produced a body of 
language use and teaching that was almost purely positivist in its outlook and methods; 
on the other hand it produced a body of language use and praxis that was purely 
pluralist and social-constructivist. This, I believe, speaks to its complicated realism, 
and use of what might very tentatively be called a ‘Protestant natural law’ philosophy 
of language. 
 While hardly a novel claim, the hinge for interpreting Scottish rhetoric has its 
focus on the project of virtue, or moral betterment of civil society. In the work of 
Campbell, Blair, and Bain, the reinstatement of ‘inventio’ through the union of logic 
and eloquence in the Common Sense epistemology results in a coherent theory of how 
our language use refracts our faculties and capacities. 
 It is profoundly relational, from its internal relation of faculties to one another 
and the outside world, to the outside world’s infinitude of relationships. By Scottish 
rhetoric’s recursive art of knowing ourselves through knowing our audience, it 
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premises not unfaltering principals of rhetorical knowing, but a method of praxis/a 
practice of inquiry. 
 As a method, the Scottish rhetoric utilizes two conceptual frameworks, which 
each inform knowledge of the other: 1) the historical, cultural, and local nexus of 
practices and ideas in language, and 2) a concept of a natural and universal law. 
 This practice, from Reid onward, converges on the teaching of eloquence, for 
the first inherent reason that our faculties of knowing must be facilitated through this 
practice, and for the second that our faculties of knowing effect and affect the premises 
for discourse, and thus, the substance and context of civil life. Scottish philosophy 
saw, as did the classical writers they admired, that the rhetorical arts create the social 
order. But unlike other moments of civil society, the Scots had to address the new 
order of a religiously fractured state. While Scottish society was profoundly Christian, 
the doctrinal, ecclesiastical, and theological practices of the Scottish Protestant 
traditions of Christianity were contested (although not with as much genuine 
difference as in America, England, or Continental Europe). The Scottish rhetors were 
champions of religious tolerance in their own society, and they developed a system 
that, because of its realist orientation, could sustain and work in a reasonably 
uncommitted external way. The entire project of the art of rhetoric is to find and form 
a basis of moral consensus using a flexible method of inquiry. 
 Pluralistic societies require just such a tool, which the Scottish Enlightenment 
assessed. The challenge, says Donald J. Wolf, S.J., (writing in the 1960s), is to ‘form a 
moral consensus in a society which is, and will remain, pluralist.’43 Current theories of 
pluralism confront questions posed by societies in which moral differences run so 
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counter that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find genuine consensus, and the 
resulting rhetoric and discourse is failed and hollow. We very often see politics as 
sophism at its worst, and yet, ‘democratic societies that are fully committed to freedom 
of religion have decided there are certain norms and values so fundamental to human 
existence and so deeply held that religion cannot be used as a basis for their 
violation.’44 There must be moral consensus on recurring levels, and this must happen 
through citizens who exercise internalized habits of mind through and within civil 
discourse. This is what Wolf calls ‘an attitude about the conditions of cooperation’,45 
and what Alistair MacIntyre terms ‘tradition-transcendent rationality.’46 What I 
suggest here is that the Scottish Common Sense school offered a deeply theorized 
method of inquiry in the form of their Common Sense realist rhetorics in answer to 
this need in their modern pluralist democracy. This method, I further hypothesize, is a 
crucial moment in the history of Protestant natural law. It converges with Thomistic 
natural law theory in that theory’s three-fold assertion: 1) natural law is a ‘living 
response of reflective intellects of any age to the implications of human experience,’ 
2) ‘the structure of the being which acts determines the structure of the being’s 
activity, and therefore this activity develops, fulfills, and perfects being,’ 3) that 
‘because man is an intelligent and free creature, the natural law for man is a moral law, 
that is, a law which he discerns and freely accepts or rejects’.47 It diverges from the 
Thomistic model in that it keeps a very strong break between nature and revelation, in 
that it is a tool for the discernment of the moral law and can operate freely and flexibly 
in a religiously plural environment. It may be rightly part of the Protestant tradition at 
the very least in that it harnesses exigencies of Protestant Christianity to form a new 
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means to address these exigencies. 
 Looking at the heritage of Scottish rhetoric in this way adds yet another 
dimension to its complicated trajectories. This points to a final concluding remark on 
the tensions that are always at work between theory and practice, and the possibilities 
that this tension affords to Scottish philosophy, if the case of the Scottish rhetoric is 
examined as its deeply theorized practical development. 
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Notes 
1 Lauer (2004): 39. 
2 Conley (1990): 223. 
3 America, of course, has a more thorough and earlier engagement with the issues of 
religious pluralism, and here, too, Scottish Common Sense philosophy, and perhaps 
more pointedly, rhetoric, does indeed play an inestimable role in that engagement. 
4 It may be partly because so much Scottish Common Sense thinking was specifically 
addressed to Humean skepticism that there may be found this anticipatory gesture. It is 
certainly not because any one of the Common Sense school would have foreseen, 
desired, or anticipated a fully pluralist society, much less a secular state. As Jennifer 
Herdt, in her dissertation on Hume, points out, after the religious wars of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries: ‘There was an urgent need for shared vocabularies in which 
to conceive of human society and common welfare beyond the boundaries of sectarian 
identities and loyalties... Many of the key figures in this process of secularization 
were, of course, themselves religious, and held beliefs about the particular nature of 
the deity and the appropriate way in which to worship and to serve such a deity. 
Nevertheless, for strategic purposes they employed non-sectarian justifications for 
their public social and political social proposals’ (Herdt, 1994, vii-viii). Many of the 
Moderati were very much in this mold. I am using the term ‘secular’ here and 
elsewhere to refer to the fact that methodology and theory are capable of operating 
outside of specifically religiously-inflected discourse, and am not meaning to imply 
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